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I. INTRODUCTION
Failing states are havens for terrorism.1  A toxic combination of
social, economic, and political crises attract violent extremist groups
to establish bases in these lawless areas.2  As the groups grow in
strength, the violence spreads from the immediate vicinity to the na-
tion, region, and sometimes even other continents.3  One need only
look to the terrorist attacks in New York, London, Madrid, and Paris
as proof that terrorists operating out of failing states eventually set
their sights on attacking Western capitals.4  Although the underlying
causes of terrorism are often local, the violence is no longer contained
within a particular country or region.5  Whether originating in Af-
ghanistan, the Northwest Frontier of Pakistan, Somalia, Iraq, or
1. See Stefan Mair, A New Approach: The Need to Focus on Failing States, HARV.
INT’L REV., Winter 2008, at 52, 53 (arguing failing states encourage international
terrorism and organized crime); William F. S. Miles, Deploying Development to
Counter Terrorism: Post-9/11 Transformation of U.S. Foreign Aid to Africa, 55
AFR. STUD. REV., Dec. 2012, at 27, 31–32.
2. Pinar Bilgin & Adam D. Morton, From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of
Short-termism*, 24 POLITICS 169, 173 (2004); Jo¨rg Raab & H. Brinton Milward,
Dark Networks as Problems, 13 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 413 (2003) (“There
is increasing evidence of a close connection between Al Qaeda and the failed
states of Liberia, Sierra Leonne, and Burkino Faso in West Africa.”); PAUL J.
SMITH, THE TERRORISM AHEAD: CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONAL VIOLENCE IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 187 (2008).
3. See Zaryab Iqbal & Harvey Starr, Bad Neighbors: Failed States and Their Conse-
quences, 25 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 315, 338 (2008) (arguing the instabil-
ity and unrest in a failing state place neighboring states and the region at risk of
similar problems).
4. For a timely discussion of the shifting counterterror measures adopted by France
after the November 12, 2015, Paris Attacks, see generally Khaled A. Beydoun,
Beyond the Paris Attacks: Unveiling the War Within French Counterterror Policy,
AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
5. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY 2–3 (2008); Leonardo Helland
& Stefan Borg, The Lure of State Failure, 16 INTERVENTIONS 877, 880 (2013);
About S/CRS, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (July 15, 2008), http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/
crs/c12936.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/23HM-Z93R]; THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NA-
TIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002), http://www
.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/5JJK-YC6C]
(“The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan,
can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.  Poverty
does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers.  Yet poverty, weak in-
stitutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks
and drug cartels within their borders.”); Mair, supra note 1, at 55; President Ba-
rack Obama, Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy
Commencement Ceremony (May 28, 2014) (transcript available at https://www
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-mil-
itary-academy-commencement-ceremony [https://perma.unl.edu/R739-YX85])
(“[B]ut also beyond Europe’s borders where our NATO allies must pull their
weight to counterterrorism and respond to failed states and train a network of
partners.”). But see Edward Newman, Failed States and International Order:
Constructing a Post-Westphalian World, 30 CONTEMP. SECURITY POL’Y, 421 (2009)
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Syria, the rise of terrorist groups has become a worldwide problem
that threatens the safety of citizens in both the Eastern and Western
Hemispheres, albeit in differing degrees.6
Yet, global counterterrorism strategies focus more on symptoms
rather than the underlying social, political, and economic conditions
that produce politically motivated violence.7  In particular, counterter-
rorism policies are driven by military and security interests of author-
itarian states whose state violence breeds more violence by nonstate
actors.  Moreover, Western nations often limit their counterterrorism
practices to merely preventing violence on their soil.  But with the ad-
vancement of technology, fluidity of borders, and ubiquity of interna-
tional travel, countries can no longer afford to ignore the deteriorating
conditions in failing states where terrorists set up bases.8  Nor can
they limit their interest in failed states to bombing terrorist training
camps or pushing terrorists underground.9  Only when the underlying
political, social, and economic local hardships that produce fertile
grounds for terrorists to operate are addressed can security improve
for all people.10  Simply put, citizens in the West can no longer wall
themselves off from violence inflicted on citizens in the East.
Accordingly, this Article argues for a paradigm shift in the preven-
tive goals of global counterterrorism policies.  Specifically, human de-
velopment based on the local needs of failing states—not the interests
of authoritarian regimes and their Western allies—should drive global
counterterrorism strategy.  Furthermore, human development should
(critiquing the focus on failed states post-9/11 as a political construction that pro-
duces threat inflation); Bilgin & Morton, supra note 2, at 170.
6. Seth Kaplan, Identifying Truly Fragile States, WASH. Q., Spring 2014, at 49, 50;
Bob de Graaff, ‘There’s a Good Reason They are Called al-Qaeda in Iraq.  They are
al-Qaeda. . .in. . .Iraq.’  The Impossibility of a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,
or the End of the Nation State, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON COUNTER-TERRORISM
11, 12 (Lee Jarvis & Michael Lister eds., 2015).
7. Bilgin & Morton, supra note 2, at 170; Justin Logan & Christopher Preble, Fixing
Failed States: A Cure Worse than the Disease?, HARV. INT’L REV., Winter 2008, at
62 (critiquing the “consensus view that the United States must reconstitute its
national security bureaucracy in order to develop the capacity to fix failed
states.”).
8. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 5, at 1 (“America is now threatened less by con-
quering states than we are by failing ones.”).
9. Morten Bøa˚s & Kathleen M. Jennings, ‘Failed States’ and ‘State Failure’: Threats
or Opportunities?, 4 GLOBALIZATIONS 475, 479–80 (2007) (arguing that the U.S.
did not take interest in Afghanistan or Somalia until after 2001 because the
Taliban harbored Osama bin Laden, not because of humanitarian or governance-
based definitions of state failure); DEP’T OF STATE & USAID, THE FIRST QUADREN-
NIAL DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 12 (2010), http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/153108.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/6LBW-M8SE].
10. Kaplan, supra note 6, at 52 (“[A] locally driven, productive system of governance
[is] a prerequisite for any attempt to develop or democratize.”).
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go beyond meeting fundamental needs such as food, shelter, and water
to address political reforms demanded by the local population.
By failing to confront authoritarianism and its offspring, political
repression, the international community misguidedly relies on
counterproductive military and security-driven policies that produce,
rather than prevent, violence.  With the rise of violent transnational
actors and fluid borders, the international community loses more than
it gains by supporting dictators under the auspices of preserving sta-
bility.  Dictatorships breed terrorism as they inculcate a culture of vio-
lence and instill fear, suspicion, and aggression among the citizens.  In
turn, violence becomes the only means to effectuate change in a zero-
sum, winner-takes-all political system.
To demonstrate the flaws in security-driven, as opposed to develop-
ment-driven, counterterrorism strategies that permeate the global
“war on terror,” I examine Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula as a case study.
The Sinai serves as an illustration of how a failing sub-state composed
of a population long neglected by domestic and international develop-
ment initiatives produces a growing militant insurgency that contrib-
utes toward destabilization of the state and the region.11  Indeed, the
violence in the Sinai has reached a tipping point wherein the violence
perpetrated by nonstate militant groups has not only terrorized the
local population and destabilized Egypt but has also buttressed the
global threat posed by the self-described Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS).  Thus, what happens in Sinai can offer valuable insights
for policy makers and international organizations engaged in human
development and counterterrorism in failing states or sub-states.
While Egypt is not currently a failed state according to interna-
tional indexes,12 the poor social, political, and economic conditions in
the Sinai have attracted violent extremist groups whose lethal attacks
on Egyptian soldiers and civilians is threatening the security of all
Egyptians.13  With the establishment of Wilayat Sinai as a branch of
11. See, e.g., ZACK GOLD, INT’L CTR. FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM, SECURITY IN THE SINAI:
PRESENT AND FUTURE 19 (2014), http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Gold-Se-
curity-In-The-Sinai-March-2014.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/CP84-G6PH] (noting
that Sinai can be compared to the western tribal areas of Pakistan that has be-
come a safe-haven for foreign terrorists).
12. See Charles T Call, The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State’, 29 THIRD WORLD Q. 1491,
1496 (2008) (arguing that authoritarian states as among the categories of states
that warrant more empirical research as a cause of instability, conflict, and weak
state institutions).
13. This has contributed toward Egypt’s fragility ranking of 38 out of 177 countries in
the Failed State Index.  With the most stable country (Finland) at a 17.8 index
and the least stable countries (Somalia and South Sudan) with a 114.0 index,
Egypt’s stands at 90.  Among the various factors measured to determine a coun-
try’s failed state index, Egypt’s worst indicators are factionalized elites, group
grievances, poverty and economic decline, lack of state legitimacy, poor human
rights and rule of law, and an abusive security apparatus.  Egypt’s Social Indica-
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ISIS, the violence is likely to spread to and merge with violence in
neighboring countries.
Couched in the critical security studies literature,14 this Article ar-
gues that counterterrorism strategies and policies are deficient in at
least three ways: (1) they are shaped by Western counterterrorism
agendas that focus on short term prevention of violent extremism on
Western soil without meaningfully addressing the underlying politi-
cal, social, and economic conditions that contribute to the rise of vio-
lent extremism over the long run;15 (2) they securitize human
development problems that result in over-allocating resources to mili-
tary and security personnel and an environment fertile for terrorist
recruitment of the local population;16 and (3) they fail to localize and
contextualize the causes of violent extremism that arise from un-
derdevelopment.17  Rather than merely attempt to stop the next at-
tack, the international community should have the long view of
addressing the underlying social, political, and economic hardships
that produce fertile grounds for politically motivated violence to
thrive.18  That is, by shifting the focus from security to human devel-
opment, resources will be allocated to building institutions and demo-
tors are as follow: Demographic Pressures 7.1; Refugees and Internally Displaced
Persons 6.7; Group Grievance 8.7; Human Flight and Brain Drain 4.7.  Egypt’s
Economic Indicators are as follow: Uneven Economic Development 6.5; Poverty
and Economic Decline 8.1; Political Indicators; State Legitimacy 8.7; Public Ser-
vices 5.4; Human Rights & Rule of Law 9.8; Security Apparatus 8.2; Factional-
ized Elites 9.0; External Intervention 7.1. Fragile States Index 2015, FUND FOR
PEACE, http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015 [https://perma.unl.edu/FV2P-
P3NA].
14. COUNTER-TERRORISM AND STATE POLITICAL VIOLENCE: THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AS
TERROR (Scott Poynting & David Whyte eds., 2012); MUSLIMS IN THE WEST AFTER
9/11 (Jocelyne Cesari ed., 2010); DAVID L. ALTHEIDE, TERRORISM AND THE POLITICS
OF FEAR (2006); JENNIFER GANDHI, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER DICTATORSHIP
(2008).
15. See, e.g., Bilgin & Morton, supra note 2, at 169 (noting that public policy dis-
course on failed states focuses on symptoms of state failure, including interna-
tional terrorism, rather than conditions that cause such failures to occur).
16. Newman, supra note 5, at 434 (defining securitization as “the process by which
issues are accorded security status or seen as a threat through political labelling,
rather than as a result of their real or objective significance.”); DEPARTMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, MAKING GOVERNANCE WORK FOR THE POOR, 2006,
Cm. 6876 (UK) (converging security, peace-building, and development); Call,
supra note 12, at 1496–97.
17. Bøa˚s & Jennings, supra note 9, at 476 (“Every state is a culmination of unique
historical processes.”); de Graaff, supra note 6, at 18–19.
18. But see Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Pilot-
ing the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, at 8–10,
DCD(2005)11/REV2 (Aug. 17, 2005) (focusing on state building as a central focus
of development); Rachel Stohl & Michael Stohl, Failing the Failed: The Bush Ad-
ministration and Failed States, HARV. INT’L REV., Winter 2008, at 56, 60 (arguing
that the failing states need development support from the international
community).
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cratic processes from the bottom up rather than strengthening
military and security institutions with abysmal human rights records
and a track record of political repression.19
While I acknowledge that scholars disagree on the criteria that
should inform a state’s failing status,20 I adopt the Peace Fund Index
criteria in evaluating the social, political, and economic conditions in
the Sinai to argue for development-driven counterterrorism.21  This
Article employs the various criteria in the Index as a means of illus-
trating the myriad ways Sinai informs analysis of other failing sub-
states harmed by militarized and security-driven counterterrorism.22
Specifically, the following factors contribute towards the Sinai’s fail-
19. Call, supra note 12, at, 1498; Declan Walsh, Italian Student’s Brutal Killing May
Be Issue in Egypt-U.S. Meetings, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes
.com/2016/02/08/world/middleeast/egypt-italy-giulio-regeni-cairo.html?_r=0.
20. The debates on the utility of the empirical approach to defining failed state status
are beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Mair, supra note 1, at 52 (noting
that most scholars agree that “a state must be able to exert a monopoly on the use
of force within its borders, provide legitimate political and legal order, and offer
essential services in health, education, and physical infrastructure,” but beyond
that there is little consensus as to what constitutes a failed state); Bilgin & Mor-
ton, supra note 2, at 173–74 (noting the binary discourse on “ ‘failed’ versus ‘suc-
cessful’ states” reflects the continuation of Cold War discourses of binary
oppositions); Bøa˚s & Jennings, supra note 9, at 475; Call, supra note 12, at 1491
(arguing that the terms failed and failing states are used in such divergent ways
that they have lost any utility); Helland & Borg, supra note 5, at 877; Kaplan,
supra note 6, at 49; Newman, supra note 5, at 421; Logan & Preble, supra note 7,
at 62 (critiquing the use of the term failed state without a consistent and accurate
definition).
21. Fragile States Index 2015, supra note 13; see, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 6, at 50–51
(critiquing the Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index).
22. The Fund for Peace index focuses on social, economic, and political and military
indicators.  Social indicators are demographic pressures, refugees and internally
displaced persons, group grievance, and human flight and brain drain.  The eco-
nomic indicators are uneven economic development and poverty and economic
decline.  The political and military indicators are state legitimacy, public ser-
vices, human rights and rule of law, security apparatus, factionalized elites, and
external intervention. The Indicators, FUND FOR PEACE, http://fsi.fundforpeace
.org/indicators [https://perma.unl.edu/797Y-92QU]; see Fragile States Index 2015,
supra note 13.  Other failed state indices use similar factors but different nomen-
clature.  For example, the Harvard Failed States Project Index identifies the fol-
lowing attributes of a failing state: (1) loss of physical control of its territory; (2)
loss of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; (3) erosion of legitimate author-
ity to make collective decisions; (4) inability to provide reasonable public services;
(5) extensive corruption and criminal behavior; (6) inability to collect taxes; (7)
inability to draw on citizen support; (8) large-scale involuntary dislocation; (9)
sharp economic decline or depression; (10) group-based inequality; (11) institu-
tionalized persecution or discrimination; (12) severe demographic pressures; (13)
brain drain; and (14) environmental decay.  Helland & Borg, supra note 5, at 887;
see Call, supra note 12, at 1491–92 (noting the convergence of interest between
progressives seeking to direct international humanitarian aid to residents in poor
conflict zones and conservatives seeking to prevent terrorism in failed states that
harbor terrorists).
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ing sub-state status:23 (1) political marginalization and displace-
ment;24 (2) poor infrastructure;25 (3) religious and political violence;26
23. The Fragile States Index includes the following factors in its assessment of
states, which I apply to the Sinai context throughout the paper: (1) water scar-
city, (2) displacement, (3) discrimination, (4) powerlessness, (5) religious violence,
(6) disproportionately lower incomes than mainland Egypt, (7) unemployment,
(8) high youth unemployment, (9) an illicit economy, (10) drug trade, (11) corrup-
tion, (12) police abuses, (13) criminality, (14) insufficient education provision, (15)
insufficient roads, (16) poor infrastructure, (17) poor sanitation, (18) lack of press
freedom, (19) violation of civil liberties, (20) no political freedoms, (21) human
trafficking, (22) political prisoners, (23) torture, (24) executions, (25) arms
proliferation, (26) fatalities in conflict, (27) rebel activity, (28) bombings, and (29)
internal conflict. The Indicators, supra note 22.
24. Dina Ezzat, Sinai-The Challenges Ahead, AL-AHRAM WKLY. (June 2, 2015, 4:08
A.M.), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/10379/17/Sinai—The-challenges-
ahead.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/NP47-FGG7]; Hilary Gilbert, Nature = Life:
Environmental Identity as Resistance in South Sinai, NOMADIC PEOPLES, Dec.
2013, at 40, 60 [hereinafter Gilbert, Nature = Life]; Ramzy Baroud, Fighting for
Survival in the Sinai, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.atimes.com/
atimes/Middle_East/MID-01-281014.html [https://perma.unl.edu/T7UB-QKCS]
[hereinafter Baroud, Fighting]; Ramzy Baroud, Poverty Has Bred Resentment in
Sinai, GULF NEWS (Nov. 4, 2014, 8:00 PM), http://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/
poverty-has-bred-resentment-in-sinai-1.1408128 [https://perma.unl.edu/RPC5-
SCGP] [hereinafter Baroud, Poverty] (“Despite a media blackout in Sinai, the
scene of devastation created by the military campaign is becoming clearer by the
day.  ‘Using bulldozers and dynamite’, the army has demolished as many as 800
houses and displaced up to 10,000 people, the New York Times reported.  Al
Sissi’s spokesman referred to the demolished neighbourhoods as terrorist
‘hotbeds.’”).
25. Press Release, Embassy of the U.S. in Cairo, Egypt, Egyptian and US Partners to
Renovate Water Trucks to Increase Supply of Drinking Water to Central Sinai
Families (Mar. 28, 2012), http://egypt.usembassy.gov/pr032812.html [https://per
ma.unl.edu/DHF2-WSHM]; Sinai Ignored in Egypt Development Plans, AL-MONI-
TOR (May 1, 2014), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/sinai-
egypt-residents-anger-empty-government-promises.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
SSC8-P3YG]; U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., LIVELIHOOD AND INCOME FROM THE
ENVIRONMENT IN SINAI (LIFE SINAI) 5 (Apr. 2012), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/
PA00HR6D.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/ZP49-8NQH].
26. Mara Revkin, Egypt’s Power Vacuum is Radicalizing the Sinai Peninsula, WASH.
POST (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/egypts-power-
vacuum-is-radicalizing-the-sinai-peninsula/2013/08/29/77c427d2-10bb-11e3-
bdf6-e4fc677d94a1_story.html [https://perma.unl.edu/6VY5-FZEH] (“In a widely
circulated video in July, a pro-Morsi protester warned Gen. Abdel Fatah al-Sissi:
‘You have created a new Taliban and a new al-Qaeda in Egypt.’  In Sinai, this
message resonates with both radical and more mainstream Islamists who in-
creasingly resort to violence to avenge what they regard as criminal state ac-
tion.”); Sinai ‘Suicide Bombing’ Kills At Least 6 Egyptian Policemen, 10 Wounded,
RUSSIA TODAY (Nov. 4, 2015, 11:31 AM), https://www.rt.com/news/320730-police-
men-killed-sinai-bombing/ [https://perma.unl.edu/3F9J-4SNY]; Ashraf Sweilam,
Roadside Bomb Kills Egypt Officer in Restive Sinai, U.S. NEWS (April 16, 2015,
6:53 A.M.), http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/04/16/roadside-
bombing-kills-officer-in-egypts-restive-sinai [https://perma.unl.edu/8D2X-BYXJ]
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(4) poverty and unemployment;27 (5) an illicit economy, arms prolifer-
ation and drug trade;28 (6) absence of civil liberties;29 and (7) internal
conflict.30  I will address these factors throughout the Article to
demonstrate how such factors result in a rise of politically motivated,
nonstate violence in the Sinai.
The Article is structured as follows.  Part II provides a brief sum-
mary of Sinai’s modern history, including the Egyptian state’s system-
atic mistreatment of the Bedouin that has trapped them between
state and nonstate violence.31  It goes into detail on the securitized
27. Gilbert, Nature = Life, supra note 24, at 48 (“The poverty resulting from this
exclusion is very real.  Egyptian employers decline to employ Bedu.  The limited
education most now receive does not provide access to better employment and
most of those working at all survive in low-paid, insecure jobs.”); Heba Aziz, Em-
ployment in a Bedouin Community: The Case of the Town of Dahab in South Si-
nai, NOMADIC PEOPLES, Nov. 2000, at 28; Hilary Gilbert, ‘This Is Not Our Life, Its
Just A Copy Of Other People’s’: Bedu And The Price Of ‘Development’ In South
Sinai, NOMADIC PEOPLES, Dec. 2011, at 7, 9, 19 [hereinafter Gilbert, This Is Not
Our Life . . .].
28. Gilbert, This Is Not Our Life . . . , supra note 27, at 18; Gold, supra note 11, at 7
(“Criminal smuggling, of course, did thrive in Sinai.  As is often the case in border
regions, members of Sinai tribes took advantage of relations in neighboring
states and territories to smuggle people, drugs, goods and weapons into Israel
and Gaza.”); Baroud, Poverty, supra note 24; OLIVER WALTON, GOVERNANCE AND
SOC. DEV. RES. CTR., HELPDESK RESEARCH REPORT: CONFLICT, EXCLUSION AND
LIVELIHOODS IN THE SINAI REGION OF EGYPT 6 (2012), http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/
open/hdq834.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/SX6X-UEL7] (“The border with Israel is
also an important site of trafficking, particularly for migrants and prostitutes.
Some reports suggest that Bedouins have become increasingly involved in the
trafficking of African migrants to Israel in recent years.”).
29. Shahira Amin, Egypt: Law Will “Severely Erode Civil Liberties”, INDEX ON CEN-
SORSHIP (April 14, 2014), https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/04/egypt-law-
will-severely-erode-civil-liberties/ [https://perma.unl.edu/726G-D5VC]; Nour
Youssef, How Egyptian Media Has Become a Mouthpiece for the Military State,
GUARDIAN (June 25, 2015, 11:52 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/
jun/25/egyptian-media-journalism-sisi-mubarak [https://perma.unl.edu/2QPU-
SSEN].
30. Egypt Executes Six Men Convicted of Killing Soldiers After ‘Grossly Unfair’ Trial,
GUARDIAN (May 17, 2015, 11:25 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/
may/17/egypt-executes-six-members-of-isis-aligned-militant-group-sinai-province
[https://perma.unl.edu/Z3X6-EASD] (reporting concerns with unfair trials for six
men executed for allegedly carrying out terrorist attacks in Sinai); Toqa Ezzidin,
Geographically Hard To Secure: North Sinai Caught In Crossfire Between Army,
Militants, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (July 8, 2015), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/
2015/07/08/geographically-hard-to-secure-north-sinai-caught-in-crossfire-be-
tween-army-militants/ [https://perma.unl.edu/K2UX-LS4E] (reporting on water
shortage and skyrocketing inflation in Sinai); Sinai ‘Suicide Bombing’ Kills At
Least 6 Egyptian Policemen, 10 Wounded, supra note 26; Sweilam, supra note 26.
31. The Bedu people (literally: “people of the desert”) are groups found throughout
North Africa and the Middle East.  In Sinai, the Bedouin make up eleven to thir-
teen semi-nomadic tribes with indistinct boundaries.  The Bedu people had a
“core” livelihood before countries such as Israel and Egypt attempted to “develop”
the region.  Especially in southern Sinai, this consisted of working in mountain-
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governance of Sinai, in part due to the terms of the Egyptian–Israeli
Peace Treaty, and the consequent social, economic, and political hard-
ships of local residents.  Frequent closure of the border between Gaza
and Rafah, for example, makes illegal smuggling all but inevitable
due to the consequent scarcity of consumer goods in Gaza and dearth
of employment in Rafah.  Moreover, Egypt’s harsh treatment of its
North Sinai residents coupled with Israel’s mistreatment of Gazans
gives the two beleaguered communities a common cause to fight both
states.32  The absence of employment opportunities, inferior schools,
and harsh over-policing fuels an environment of resentment toward
the state that terrorist groups have leveraged to expand their opera-
tions after Egypt’s January 25, 2011, uprisings.33  Thus, Egypt, Israel,
the United States, and their allies should consider amending the
Camp David Accords to transform the Sinai, particularly in the North,
from barren military zones to a thriving part of Egypt where the
Bedouin and other local residents can find gainful employment, re-
ceive government services commensurate with their Egyptian compa-
triots, and live in peace.34
Part III proceeds to examine how local problems engendered politi-
cally motivated violence in Sinai.  Various militant groups recruited
Bedouin and Egyptians from the mainland to violently oppose the
state.  Terrorist attacks on resorts in South Sinai from 2004 to 2006
led to massive arbitrary arrests of Bedouin from nearly every village,
hundreds of whom were detained for years without trial.35  Thus,
when the 2011 uprisings occurred, the Sinai was fertile grounds for
ous regions cultivating orchard fruits and dates and pastoralism.  These are the
labors that largely made up what Bedouin believed made people Bedouin.  Gil-
bert, This Is Not Our Life . . ., supra note 27, at 9.
32. See MOHANNAD SABRY, SINAI: EGYPT’S LINCHPIN, GAZA’S LIFELINE, ISRAEL’S
NIGHTMARE 131 (2015).
33. Adham Youssef, Wounds and Medicines of Sinai, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (May 12,
2015), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/05/12/wounds-and-medicines-of-si-
nai/ [https://perma.unl.edu/5SY5-BLQY]; SABRY, supra note 32, at 35–36.
34. See Genevieve Belmaker, Sinai ‘Basically a War Zone’ Says Expert, as Pentagon
Plans Changes to Observer Deployments, CNS NEWS (Apr. 28, 2016, 6:26 PM),
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/genevieve-belmaker/sinai-basically-war-
zone-says-expert-pentagon-plans-changes-observer [https://perma.unl.edu/63LH-
WT8Z]; Heidi Breen, Egypt: Freedom and Justice to the Bedouins in Sinai? 59
(Autumn 2013) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Oslo) (on file with the
Department of Cultural Studies and Oriental Languages, University of Oslo),
https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/39058/Master_Heidi_Breen.pdf?
sequence=1 [https://perma.unl.edu/L2L2-YPJZ] (finding that the absence of de-
velopment and cities coupled with the rough terrain makes Sinai attractive to
terrorist groups). But see AMR YOSSEF & JOSEPH R. CERAMI, THE ARAB SPRING
AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST: EMERGING SECURITY THREATS AND
REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE 11–12 (2015) (arguing the failure of Arab states is due
more to the weakness of its bureaucracy, i.e., its stateness).
35. SABRY, supra note 32, at 23–24.
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the resurgence of violent extremist groups partially composed of
Bedouin seeking revenge for decades of abuse and humiliation at the
hands of state security.36  Part III also looks at the current situation
in Sinai wherein the self-described Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) established a foothold when the Egyptian group Ansar Bayt al-
Maqdis pledged its allegiance to ISIS.  With an influx of weapons from
Libya after the fall of Ghaddafi and arms smuggling at an all-time
high, the Sinai appears to be on the path toward becoming a failing
sub-state beyond the control of the Egyptian state.37
The Egyptian military’s scorched-earth response, including tearing
down 1,000 meters of residential homes in Rafah, has only made mat-
ters worse.38  As Egyptian military tanks storm schools, uproot olive
trees, and destroy thousands of homes, the possibility of a working
relationship between the citizenry and government plummets.39  Ex-
ploiting the local population’s economic deprivation and distrust of the
state, violent extremist groups have burgeoned.  Moreover, the secur-
ity and political vacuum arising from the 2011 uprisings has allowed
new militant groups to form as existing groups grow stronger.40
While development initiatives have been undertaken in the Sinai,
development has been the handmaiden of a securitized approach to
governing Sinai.  Part III argues that development by Egypt and the
United States has proven to be half-hearted at best and futile at
worst.  Funds for human and economic development are both insuffi-
cient and inappropriately spent pursuant to Cairo-based Egyptian of-
ficials’ political agendas.  Rarely are Bedouin tribal leaders and other
Sinai leaders included in the negotiations for developing the Sinai.41
Nor are they in elected offices representing the Sinai.42  When
Bedouin are invited to discuss their grievances with Egyptian officials,
36. Gold, supra note 11, at 3 (noting the pace and lethality of attacks today is much
worse than in the past).
37. Mair, supra note 1, at 53; SABRY, supra note 32, at 147 (noting state authorities
had little control of Sinai after the 2011 uprisings); Ezzat, supra note 24.
38. Gold, supra note 11, at 14.
39. Egypt Cabinet Approves New ‘Terrorist Entities’ Law, AHRAM ONLINE (Nov. 27,
2014), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/116565/Egypt/Politics-/
Egypt-cabinet-approves-new-antiterrorism-law.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/
767Q-E2XG]; Egyptian Army Struggles to Address Terrorism in Sinai, AL-MONI-
TOR (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/sinai-
egypt-army-failure-war-terrorism.html# [https://perma.unl.edu/YUC4-ZJPP].
40. The active militant groups before Egypt’s 2011 uprisings include Tawhid wal Ji-
had that is allegedly tied to Al Qaeda, Salafiya Jihadiya, Mujahideen Council,
and Jaysh Al Islam. JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43183, EGYPT
IN CRISIS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2013).
41. SABRY, supra note 32, at 126, 193.
42. Dona Stewart, The Sinai Bedouin: Political and Economic Discontent Turns In-
creasingly Violent, MIDDLE E. POL’Y COUNCIL (Aug. 12, 2011), http://mepc.org/ar-
ticles-commentary/commentary/sinai-bedouin-political-and-economic-discontent-
turns-increasingly-violent [https://perma.unl.edu/92ZC-KEQF] (“Though Egyp-
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their recommendations are often ignored.43  These insincere meetings
are then used by the authoritarian regime as proof that the Egyptian
government is not oppressing the people of Sinai.  But violence in Si-
nai has become so widespread that Egypt, its neighbors, and the inter-
national community can no longer afford to entertain such political
posturing.44
It is worth emphasizing that while much of the militant groups’
ideological rhetoric in Sinai has been “Islamist,”45 the militants have
a political purpose—to overthrow an Egyptian government it views as
illegitimate and oppressive.  Indeed, the first order problem in Sinai is
political, economic, and social in nature, wherein the issue of whether
the militants are in fact “Islamic” is a second order issue.  That is, the
militant groups exploit religious rhetoric to appeal to the local popula-
tion seeking relief from inequality, political repression, and human
rights abuses.  Militants (mis)interpret religion to gain support for po-
litical goals as a consequence of the fundamental role religion has
played in daily life across the Middle East since the 1970s.  In con-
trast, from the 1940s to the 1950s insurgent or opposition groups
deployed nationalism and socialism to mobilize people in furtherance
of the political goal of overthrowing a colonial government.46  This was
specific to the surge of anticolonial movements across the world and
national revolutions.  For these reasons, this Article does not engage
in the second-order debates that frame counterterrorism around the
religious legitimacy of violent extremist acts.47
Before the Sinai transitions into a full-fledged failed sub-state, the
international community and the Egyptian state should develop a
long-term preventive strategy that incorporates and welcomes Sinai
residents as stakeholders.48  Rather than be marginalized as a fifth
tian citizens, they are not allowed to join the Army or police or hold significant
government positions.”).
43. SABRY, supra note 32, at 126, 193.
44. Stohl & Stohl, supra note 18, at 60 (“Without the assistance of the international
community, weak and failing states will repeat their cycles of violence and
instability.”).
45. According to Dictionary.com, “Islamist” means supporting or advocating Islamic
fundamentalism. Islamist, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/
islamist [https://perma.unl.edu/6FA7-F9VR].
46. See FED. RESEARCH DIV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, EGYPT: A COUNTRY STUDY 56–65
(Helen Chapin Metz ed., 1991).
47. See generally Jerome P. Bjelopera, Countering Violent Extremism in the United
States, 9 INT’L J. TERRORISM & POL. HOT SPOTS 21 (2014); Jennifer S. Hendrick-
son, Counter-Radicalization: Combating Terrorism at the Core, (Aug. 2014) (un-
published M.A. thesis, Johns Hopkins University) (on file with the Sheridan
Libraries, Johns Hopkins University), https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/handle/
1774.2/38096 [https://perma.unl.edu/YWU6-NMFA].
48. See SMITH, supra note 2, at 191 (explaining one way of “mitigating terrorism” is to
change the environment by nurturing a “more equitable and fair international
system”).
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column or de facto enemies of the state, the Bedouin and other Sinai
residents should play a leading role in an intergenerational process for
bringing stability back to Sinai through development.49  The local
populations’ needs and active participation—not Western nations’ or
authoritarian regimes’ security agendas—should shape human devel-
opment in the Sinai.50  Empowering Sinai residents through self-gov-
ernance grants the local population a vested interest in working with
security forces as partners to stop militant groups’ violence against
both civilians and soldiers.51  Their economic interests and political
empowerment will also give Sinai residents a sense of belonging to the
state, thereby making terrorist recruitment efforts less effective.
II. ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION AND POLITICAL
MARGINALIZATION IN THE SINAI
Sinai did not reach its current state of lawlessness overnight.52
For decades, the Egyptian state (with the United States’ military
aid)53 has securitized governance of the Sinai.54  Rather than invest in
human and economic development that could provide Bedouin with
lawful employment, stability was achieved through fear.55  The Minis-
try of Interior and Egyptian intelligence controlled Sinai governance
49. Ezzat, supra note 24.
50. See, e.g., Logan & Preble, supra note 7, at 62 (arguing the fetish with failed states
is a modern iteration of Western imperialism to justify intervention in countries
deemed strategic to Western political interests); Bilgin & Morton, supra note 2, at
169, 171 (noting that public policy discourse on failed states focuses on symptoms
of state failure, including international terrorism, rather than conditions that
cause such failures to occur); Bøa˚s & Jennings, supra note 9, at 476 (arguing that
“the use of the failed state label is inherently political” and the conditions of weak
states does not necessarily explain the presence of terrorist groups); Call, supra
note 12, at 1496.
51. Egyptian Army Struggles to Address Terrorism in Sinai, AL-MONITOR (Feb. 11,
2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/sinai-egypt-army-fail-
ure-war-terrorism.html# [https://perma.unl.edu/73HW-8C24]; SABRY, supra note
32, at 174.
52. SABRY, supra note 32, at 172 (noting how lawlessness strengthened sharia courts
and independent tribal figures). But see Call, supra note 12, at 1499–1500 (not-
ing that failed state analysis discounts alternative forms of authority in tribes or
local strongmen that produce security for the population).
53. JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33003, EGYPT: BACKGROUND AND
U.S. RELATIONS 13–15 (2015) (“Between 1948 and 2015, the United States pro-
vided Egypt with $76 billion in bilateral foreign aid . . . including $1.3 billion a
year in military aid from 1987 to the present.”).
54. Louise Lief, Egypt Puts Stamp on Sinai, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 22, 1982),
http://www.csmonitor.com/1982/0422/042255.html [https://perma.unl.edu/6V8D-
S4UK]; YOSSEF & CERAMI, supra note 34, at 51.
55. Gold, supra note 11, at 18.
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with little regard for the needs of the local population.56  This pushed
the Bedouin into smuggling consumer goods, weapons, drugs, and
humans as a means of economic survival.57  Human rights abuses be-
came a regular occurrence as residents were swept up and tortured in
state anti-terrorism operations.58  Tensions between the people and
the state predictably reached a boiling point in January 2011 when
Sinai residents joined the mass uprisings as they burned down police
stations and chased security officers out of town.59
The securitized approach to governance in Sinai is due, in large
part, to an outdated mindset rooted in the 1979 Egyptian–Israeli
Peace Treaty.60  The Treaty is premised on preventing military en-
gagement between two states.  At the time of its signing, the Egyptian
military was noncommittal to a permanent peace, and thus did not
want to develop Sinai in the event that another conflict was neces-
sary.61  The Treaty, thus, perpetuated treating North Sinai as demili-
tarized security zones, rather than civilian areas, where restrictions
on Egyptian military activities are monitored by an international
force.62  Four decades later, however, the more pressing security con-
cerns now lie with violence by nonstate actors.63  Transnational politi-
cal Islamist groups and cross-border Bedouin clans are challenging
the authority of both Egypt and Israel.  While Israel recently granted
Egypt military permission to expand its military presence to fight ter-
rorists, the underlying militarized framework remains the same.64
Residents of Rafah, Sheikh Zuweid, and Al Arish, where violence has
56. Id.; Emma Graham-Harrison, How Sinai Became a Magnet for Terror, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 7, 2015, 7:20 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/08/sinai-
magnet-for-terror [https://perma.unl.edu/3UXF-MWD7].
57. Sara Lynch, Sinai Becomes Prison for African Migrants, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/01/world/middleeast/01iht-m01-sinai-mi-
grants.html?_r=0 (“An estimated 20 percent to 30 percent of the mostly sub-
Saharan migrants who have passed through Sinai since 2009 have been tortured,
according to Ms. Shoham.  The Israeli doctors’ group estimates that half the wo-
men have been sexually abused.”); Walton, supra note 28, at 1; Newman, supra
note 5, at 430 (noting that arms smuggling is an indicator of weak or failing
states).
58. SABRY, supra note 32, at 11.
59. Ismail Alexandrani, The War in Sinai: A Battle Against Terrorism or Cultivating
Terrorism for the Future?, ARAB REFORM INITIATIVE 19 (Mar. 2014), https://
perma.unl.edu/97B7-U5XV; SABRY, supra note 32, at 12.
60. See Shahjahan H. Bhuiyan, Can Democratic Governance Be Achieved in Egypt?,
38 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 496, 496–97 (2015).
61. See id.
62. Treaty of Peace (with Annexes and Maps), Israel-Egypt, art. II, §§ a–c, March 26,
1979, 1138 U.N.T.S. 59.
63. NICOLAS PELHAM, CHATHAM HOUSE, SINAI: THE BUFFER ERODES vi (Sept. 2012).
64. Yehudit Ronen, The Effects of the ‘Arab Spring’ on Israel’s Geostrategic and Se-
curity Environment: The Escalating Jihadist Terror in the Sinai Peninsula, 20
ISR. AFF. 302, 312–13 (2014); Hillel Frisch, The Egyptian Army and Egypt’s
‘Spring’, 36 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 180, 196 (2013).
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hit unprecedented levels, attribute the Egyptian government’s failure
to develop North Sinai to systemic neglect of the Bedouin and Israel’s
desire to keep the border area clear.65  Little regard is paid to the local
conditions that create fertile grounds for violence by nonstate actors.66
Meanwhile, the limited investments in the tourism industry in
South Sinai enrich Cairene crony capitalists and employ Egyptian mi-
grants from the Nile Delta.67  The Bedouin and other local Sinai re-
sidents are discriminated against by employers who refuse to hire
them.68  This leaves illegal smuggling as the primary means of eco-
nomic survival for the Bedouin.69  Further exacerbating their plight,
Egyptian security over-polices the Bedouin through harsh collective
punishment tactics that treat them as a fifth column.  This has
pushed some Bedouin to join militant groups and others to assist ter-
rorists in hiding from state security.70  Meanwhile, local Sinai leaders
have been largely excluded from state governance that would other-
wise allow them to represent the needs of Sinai communities.71  As a
result, deep distrust and resentment of the state persists among Sinai
residents, most acutely among the Bedouin.
With rising conflicts in the Middle East after the 1948 war, when
Arab nationalism was at its peak, the Sinai became increasingly mili-
tarized.  As tensions between Israel and Egypt grew, so too did the
Egyptian state’s suspicion of the Bedouin.  With distinct dialects and
cultures, the Egyptian government suspected the Sinai tribes as po-
tential Israeli collaborators with no loyalty to Egypt.72  Meanwhile,
Bedouin viewed Egypt as a colonizing force similar to the Turks and




67. Gilbert, This Is Not Our Life . . ., supra note 27, at 8–9 (“[S]ince 1982, when full
Egyptian government resumed, South Sinai has experienced rapid commercial
development through tourism and substantial donor investment.  An analysis for
the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (SEAM 2005: 20) concluded that ‘the
Bedouin can hardly fail to benefit from these investments’.  Yet South Sinai Bedu
remain among the poorest and most marginalized of Egyptian citizens; a position
reinforced by the government policy of settling mainland Egyptians in large num-
bers in the peninsula backed by a massive security presence.”); Gilbert, Nature =
Life, supra note 24, at 43 (“Development on this scale threatens the environment,
and the government has responded by designating almost 40 per cent of South
Sinai’s landmass and littoral as Protected Areas . . . .”); Egypt to Establish $92M
Industrial Zone in South Sinai, AL BAWABA (May 30, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www
.albawaba.com/business/egypt-establish-92m-industrial-zone-south-sinai-846024
[https://perma.unl.edu/LLS2-W8C4] (making no mention of quotas for local re-
sidents in terms of jobs).
68. Gold, supra note 11, at 3.
69. SABRY, supra note 32, at 223–24.
70. Id. at 238–40.
71. Youssef, supra note 33.
72. Gold, supra note 11, at 6.
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English before them.73  This state of distrust continues to shape the
relationship between Sinai residents and the Egyptian state, resulting
in a rise of violence between state and nonstate actors in Egypt’s
poorest region.
The following briefly summarizes how Sinai’s strategic significance
for both Israel and Egypt after decades of conflict coupled with anti-
Bedouin prejudice produced a social, economic, and political environ-
ment vulnerable to exploitation by militant groups.
A. The Sinai’s Strategic Significance
The Sinai Peninsula extends over 23,000 square miles, three times
the size of the Nile Valley and Delta.74  Its sparse population is
550,000 out of Egypt’s total population of  91 million.75  Approxi-
mately 400,000 residents are sedentary and live along the coastal
plains of the North Sinai province, including 145,000 in the Sinai capi-
tal of Al Arish.76  The other 150,000 residents live in South Sinai,
where the annual population growth has been four times the national
average due in large part to internal migration from the mainland for
tourism jobs.77
The Bedouin comprise approximately seventy percent of the total
Sinai population.  The remaining thirty percent of Sinai residents are
Palestinian (10%), Egyptian migrants from the mainland (10%), and a
mix of Bosnians, Turks, and other ethnicities who settled in Al Arish
during the Ottoman era (10%).78  Fifteen to twenty Bedouin tribes
with 500 to 25,000 men in each tribe live in Sinai, most of which are
sedentary.79  Each tribe’s territory is well-known and based on a par-
ticular tribe’s strength.80  Many tribes have strong historical and lin-
guistic ties to Gaza.  For example, the traditional lands of the Tarabin
73. Mara R. Revkin, Triadic Legal Pluralism in North Sinai: A Case Study of State,
Shari’a, and ‘Urf Courts in Conflict and Cooperation, 13 UCLA J. ISLAMIC &
NEAR E.L. 21, 47 (2014); Alexandrani, supra note 59, at 19.
74. Sinai Peninsula, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/place/Si-
nai-Peninsula [https://perma.unl.edu/SM8D-LBZS].
75. Hana Afifi, Egypt’s Population to Reach 91 Million in June, up from 90 in Decem-
ber, AHRAM ONLINE (Apr. 4, 2016), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsPrint/198714
.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/9UQ2-HU72]; PELHAM, supra note 63, at 1.
76. PELHAM, supra note 63, at 1; HUMAN DEV. PROGRAM & UNITED NATIONS DEV. PRO-
GRAMME (UNDP), EGYPT HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004 (2004), http://
hdr.undp.org/sites/defult/files/egypt_2004_en.pdf[.
77. PELHAM, supra note 63, at 1; SABRY, supra note 3258, at 8.
78. Ronen, supra note 64, at 303; Walton, supra note 28, at 2; SABRY, supra note 32,
at 8.
79. PELHAM, supra note 63, at 1; INT’L CRISIS GRP., MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA RE-
PORT N°61: EGYPT’S SINAI QUESTION 28 app. C (2007), https://d2071andvip0wj
.cloudfront.net/61-egypt-s-sinai-question.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/35RW-FH
Y8] (a map of Sinai showing Bedouin tribes).
80. Ronen, supra note 64, at 303.
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tribe extend across the Egyptian–Gazan border from Beersheva in the
East to Sinai’s western coast.81  As a result, over 40,000 Palestinian
members of the Tarabin tribe live in Rafah, Sheikh Zuweid, and El
Arish.82  Militant groups have leveraged these family relationships to
engage in cross border attacks.  The militants attack or infiltrate
Israel from Sinai in hopes of triggering an interstate war between
Egypt and Israel.83
The two countries went to war in 1967, resulting in Israel’s occupa-
tion of Sinai until 1982, three years after both countries signed the
U.S.-brokered Camp David Accords.84  During that time, Israel spent
$7 billion in infrastructure development and oil drilling and estab-
lished twelve agricultural villages.85  Under Israeli governance,
Bedouin economic livelihood transitioned from semi-nomadic pastoral
to sedentary and insecure paid work in charcoal manufacturing, shop-
keeping, camel transport, hunting, fishing, and guiding pilgrims to
Mount Sinai.86  Resort towns were built as the Sinai became a pre-
mier vacation destination for Israeli tourists.  Meanwhile, from 1967
to 1973, some Bedouin secretly assisted Egypt’s military in gathering
intelligence and facilitating undercover operations that culminated in
the October 1973 war.87  Indeed, Bedouin point to their loyal assis-
tance to Egypt when lamenting their current mistreatment as a sus-
pect group.88
After a twelve-year war of attrition, Egypt and Israel signed a
peace deal in 1979 brokered by the United States.  The Camp David
Accords created three zones in the Sinai with defined limitations on
the number of Egyptian military troops permitted in each zone.89
North Sinai’s eastern border with Israel is Zone C with the strictest
military force restrictions.90  Only civilian police are permitted to se-
81. PELHAM, supra note 63, at 1–2.
82. Id. at 1–2.
83. Ronen, supra note 64, at 312.
84. INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 79, at 5–6.
85. Lief, supra note 54.
86. Gilbert, Nature = Life, supra note 24, at 43; Gilbert, This Is Not Our Life . . .,
supra note 27, at 11 (“The bedouin economy has always included paid work, stra-
tegically combined with core occupations in order to minimize risk.  Various occu-
pations are recorded in South Sinai: charcoal manufacture, camel transport,
guiding pilgrims to Mount Sinai and working for the Monastery, and hunting and
fishing . . . .”).
87. SABRY, supra note 3258, at 52.
88. See, e.g., id. at 52, 218 (“On October 7, one day after the annual celebration of the
October 6, 1973 victory, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis targeted the South Sinai Security
Directorate with a car bomb that killed five and injured more than fifty people.”)
89. Treaty of Peace (with Annexes and Maps), Israel-Egypt, art. II, March 26, 1979,
1138 U.N.T.S. 59.
90. Id.; Lief, supra note 54.
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cure this most populous area of the Sinai.91  However, Israel has regu-
larly waived the military presence restrictions to allow for Egyptian
troops to combat militant groups attacking Israel from the Sinai.92
For example, in 2005 after the Israeli army withdrew from Gaza, the
Accords were modified to allow for 750 Egyptian “border guards” to
police the thirteen kilometer Gaza–Sinai border.93
To enforce the restrictions on Egyptian and Israeli military opera-
tions, the Accords created the Multinational Force of Observers
(MFO).94  The United States plays a leading role in overseeing over
1,600 soldiers, including approximately 700 Americans, from various
countries that comprise the MFO.95  Funding for the MFO was ini-
tially split equally between Egypt, Israel, and the United States.96
Currently, more than nine countries donate funds or equipment to the
MFO.97  Notably, militant groups point to the Camp David Accords
and the MFO as evidence of Egypt’s collusion with the West and
Israel—a common narrative used to recruit disaffected residents.98
While the Camp David Accords diffused tensions between Egypt
and Israel, they aggravated political, social, and economic conditions
for Sinai residents.  Limited development of Sinai and increased
securitization was due to the government’s distrust of the local popu-
lation, and the Bedouin in particular.99  According to former Prime
Minister Kamal Ganzouri, the Israeli government pressured the
Mubarak regime not to settle more people in or develop Sinai because
it was easier to secure without large population centers.100  Mean-
while, state policies neglect the local populations’ needs, criminalize
91. Zachary Laub, Why Egypt’s Sinai Is a Security Mess, DEF. ONE (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2013/12/why-egypts-sinai-security-mess/
75564/ [https://perma.unl.edu/7XWW-SFEY].
92. Gold, supra note 11, at 15.
93. Geoffrey Aronson, Improved Egypt-Israel Relations Through Sinai Crisis: Will




95. MFO in Numbers, MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS, http://mfo.org/en/mfo-
in-numbers [https://perma.unl.edu/487L-AVKU]; Laub, supra note 91; Andrew
Tilghman, New ISIS Threat Prompts U.S. to Send 75 More Troops to Egypt’s Si-
nai, MIL. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2015, 5:14 PM), http://www.militarytimes.com/story/
military/pentagon/2015/09/10/new-troops—sinai/72018008/ [https://perma.unl
.edu/D3XA-NMQZ] (noting the United States’ decision to send an additional 75
troops to the MFO in response to the rising threat of insurgents associated with
ISIS).
96. Gold, supra note 11, at 17.
97. Id. (noting that Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK contributed
troops to the MFO and that Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland
donated funds).
98. Ronen, supra note 64, at 312.
99. Gilbert, Nature = Life, supra note 24, at 46.
100. Sinai Ignored in Egypt Development Plans, supra note 25.
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the Bedouin, and perpetuate the status quo of limited development
that excludes Bedouin as beneficiaries.101
B. Neglect and Criminalization of the Bedouin
The past three decades have left the Bedouin and other local re-
sidents feeling betrayed.  Their list of grievances include being prohib-
ited from owning land; confiscation of their tribal lands for tourism
development that has excluded them from the profits; exclusion from
jobs with the police, army, or MFO; and pervasive prejudice against
Bedouin culture.102  Despite rhetoric stating otherwise, the limited
development funds spent on the Sinai by the European Union, United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), or the Egyp-
tian government are not improving the livelihoods of indigenous popu-
lations.103  Thus, any attempts to transition Sinai from the brink of
becoming a failed state should not only adopt effective development
programs, but also de-securitize governance by treating the Bedouin
as equal citizens who have an important role to play in the process.104
Despite its rich history and strategic importance, the Sinai’s local
residents remain isolated and neglected.  The state’s strategy has
been to coercively assimilate Bedouin culture while ignoring their so-
cial and economic needs.105  For over three decades, investment in Si-
nai has been inadequate while its population has suffered under harsh
security measures.106  Although Sinai experienced a boost in invest-
ment after Egypt took back possession from Israel in 1982, it was
101. Max Strasser, Sinai: A War Zone in Waiting, NEW STATESMEN (Aug. 15, 2012),
http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/world-affairs/2012/08/sinai-war-
zone-waiting [https://perma.unl.edu/XX7S-WBE8] (“The area has long been ne-
glected in terms of economic development.  It has one of Egypt’s highest unem-
ployment rates.  Locals estimate that less than 50 per cent of people are formally
employed.  Because of the area’s location on the border, land development in Si-
nai requires the approval of the intelligence agencies.  The Bedouins’ list of griev-
ances is long, from not being allowed to own land to a lack of fresh water to how
the local radio station is in the dialect of mainland Egypt.  After a series of bomb-
ings at tourist resorts in South Sinai in 2004, hundreds of Bedouin were arbitrar-
ily arrested, according to Human Rights Watch.  Many of them remain in prison
to this day.”); Ashraf Khalil, The Saga of Sinai: A Neglected Hotspot Egypt’s
Morsi Must Not Let Explode, TIME (June 21, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/
06/21/the-saga-of-sinai-a-neglected-hotspot-egypts-morsi-must-not-let-explode.
102. Laub, supra note 91; Strasser, supra note 101.
103. Gold, supra note 11, at 17.
104. Ahmed Mohamed Hassan & Yara Bayoumy, Special Report: Bedouins Drawn
into Egypt’s Islamist Fight, REUTERS (July 15, 2015, 5:29 AM), http://www.reuters
.com/article/us-egypt-islam-sinai-specialreport-idUSKCN0PP0UD20150715
[https://perma.unl.edu/7M87-FVW2].
105. Gilbert, Nature = Life, supra note 24, at 41.
106. Mohamed El-Menshawy, The Cairo Elite and the Tyranny of the State, COPTS
UNITED (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.copts-united.com/English/Details.php?I=958&
A=11588 [https://perma.unl.edu/R3QV-ANS2].
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short lived.107  Moreover, the limited investment has not benefitted
the local population, resulting in pronounced disparities in the distri-
bution of wealth between the Bedouin and migrants from the Nile Val-
ley.108  The major tourism industry in South Sinai, in particular, is
owned by Cairenes or foreigners whose profits are not reinvested in
the Sinai.109  As a result, food poverty among South Sinai Bedouin is
double that of Egypt while North Sinai is Egypt’s poorest
governorate.110
Such disparities are a direct result of prejudice against the
Bedouin.  The dominant discourse in Egypt engages in reductionist
portrayals of the Bedouin as primitive, uneducated, and criminal.111
Up to 100,000 Bedouin are refused Egyptian citizenship, and thus are
not counted in official statistics.112  Exclusion from the national iden-
tity goes so far as blocking Bedouin from serving in the Egyptian mili-
tary, MFO, or police.113  And until 2007, Bedouin did not have the
right to vote.114  Egyptian political leaders of the Sinai—often dele-
gates from the Nile Valley—look down on the Bedouin as inferior and
107. Lief, supra note 54.
108. PELHAM, supra note 63, at 1.
109. Khalil, supra note 101 (noting that in 2003, South Sinai welcomed 2.6 million
foreign tourists, more than a third of Egypt’s tourists).
110. Gilbert, Nature = Life, supra note 24, at 48.  Note that the UN 2010 Human De-
velopment Report for Egypt reports a higher adult literacy rate in North and
South Sinai (75.8% and 88.4% respectively) compared to the Egyptian average
(70.4%).  However, these numbers do not include the Bedouin because they are
largely excluded from official statistics.  Walton, supra note 28, at 4.
111. Gilbert, Nature = Life, supra note 24, at 41.
112. See Hilary Gilbert & Mohammed al Jebaali, ‘Not Philanthropists but Revolution-
aries.’ Promoting Bedouin Participation In The ‘New Egypt’: A Case Study From
South Sinai 18 (Oct. 2012) (unpublished working paper) (on file with John D.
Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement, The American Univer-
sity in Cairo), http://schools.aucegypt.edu/research/gerhart/rprogram/Documents/
Voices-Latest.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/4X5Y-RVNV]; Gilbert, Nature = Life,
supra note 24, at 48; Gold, supra note 11, at 6 (noting prohibition of Bedouin from
serving in Egyptian military or police); Amr Yossef, Securing the Sinai: More
Troops Won’t Keep the Peace or Save the Egyptian-Israeli Relationship, FOREIGN
AFF. (Sept. 28, 2011), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2011-
09-28/securing-sinai [https://perma.unl.edu/7YJV-YTML].
113. Jared Malsin, Egypt is Struggling to Cope with Its ISIS Insurgency, TIME (July
23, 2015), http://time.com/3969596/egypt-isis-sinai/ [https://perma.unl.edu/K753-
WWDG]; Laub, supra note 91 (noting that Bedouin are blocked from jobs in the
police, army, and the MFO); Ehud Yaari, Sinai: A New Front, POL’Y NOTES
(Wash. Inst. for Near E. Policy, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2012, at 8, http://www
.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PoilicyNote09.pdf [https://per
ma.unl.edu/B3ZA-KHTT]; Yossef, supra note 112.
114. Gilbert & al Jebaali, supra note 112, at 8.
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criminal.115  As a result, they willingly cooperate with security ser-
vices to repress the Bedouin.116
Only a handful of civil society organizations operate in Sinai, fur-
ther aggravating the marginalization of Bedouin in development nego-
tiations and project selection.117  Any attempts to form informal local
committees to petition the government for local representation have
been ignored, or worse, invited police surveillance and suspicion of il-
licit political activity.118  Such conditions have left physical resistance
as the primary response to oppression.119  As discussed in Part III,
these circumstances produced an environment ripe for the growth of
militant groups.
Following Israel’s full withdrawal from the Sinai in 1982, Egypt
launched a campaign to develop the Sinai’s natural resources and
build on its strategic access to the Suez Canal.  The Egyptian govern-
ment sought to increase Sinai’s population of 172,000 primarily
Bedouin inhabitants to one million by incentivizing labor migration
from the Nile Valley.120  Slogans such as, “bring 3 million from the
Delta to Sinai” as part of the National Development Plan for Sinai
communicated to Egyptians that Sinai was a land without a people, or
at least a people that did not count as citizens.121  With the help of
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the government
planned to create twelve new towns and an intrusive system of roads
that violated the traditional zones of tribal authority.122  The project
displaced thousands of Bedouin from their lands with minimal, if any,
compensation.123
The Bedouin felt betrayed by the Egyptian state because they had
helped the military from 1967 to 1973 by providing them with intelli-
gence, serving as informants, and assisting Egyptians to infiltrate in
Sinai.  And yet, when Egypt took back Sinai it neither recognized their
efforts nor treated them as equal citizens.
In 1995, the government announced the National Project for the
Development of Sinai would infuse $20.5 billion into Sinai between
1995 and 2017.  Promises for improving infrastructure to deliver clean
115. Walton, supra note 28, at 7; Gilbert & al Jebaali, supra note 112, at 8–9.
116. As half of the Bedouin subsist at around or below $1 a day per person, adminis-
trators of Sinai dole out jobs and other benefits to their extended families rather
than serve the local population.  Alexandrani, supra note 59, at 18; Walton, supra
note 28, at 4.
117. Laub, supra note 91.
118. Gilbert, Nature = Life, supra note 24, at 50–51.
119. Id. at 41.
120. Revkin, supra note 73, at 46.
121. Id. at 47; Gilbert, Nature = Life, supra note 24, at 46 (noting the number was
later revised to 4.5 million residents).
122. Revkin, supra note 73, at 47–48.
123. Id. at 46.
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water, proper medical treatment, and good education to Sinai re-
sidents proved to be little more than lofty rhetoric.124  Instead, devel-
opment plans translated into the Mubarak regime selling large tracts
of land in South Sinai to his crony capitalist friends, which resulted in
pushing many Bedouin out of their coastal tribal lands toward the
barren interior of Sinai.125  Further alienating the Bedouin, few of the
tens of thousands of jobs created by the resorts sprouting up on the
South Sinai coast went to Bedouin.126
In conjunction with internal migration plans, the Egyptian govern-
ment sought to sedentarize Bedouin in order to implement large scale
land reclamation projects.  Specifically, the Egyptian government con-
verted 214,000 acres of tribal desert land into agricultural land.  Not
only were the Bedouin forcibly pushed off their land, Egyptians from
the Nile Valley were invited to migrate to farm the land.127  Bedouin
were left with lower quality land in the interior of Sinai and stripped
of their core livelihoods that constitute their Bedouin identity.128  As a
result of their structural marginalization, Bedouin view their future
through the lens of colonization by a nation that refuses to grant them
equal citizenship rights and excludes them from macroeconomic
growth.129
With no steady source of income, many Bedouin turned to smug-
gling.130  Members of Sinai tribes whose land covers the 143 mile
Israel–Egypt border leveraged their cross-border relations to smuggle
goods, people, weapons, and drugs into Israel and Gaza.131  Israel’s
blockade of Gaza starting in 2006 made smuggling the only way for
goods to enter Gaza, thereby increasing profits.132  A lucrative $500
million annual enterprise, smuggling enriches multiple stakeholders.
Egyptian police reportedly are actively involved in the drug trade
while other government officials take a cut of profits along the produc-
tion and distribution chain.133  This explains why the Mubarak re-
124. Baroud, supra note 24; Youssef, supra note 33.
125. Walton, supra note 28, at 4; Revkin, supra note 73, at 47.
126. Hassan & Bayoumy, supra note 104; Gilbert, This Is Not Our Life . . ., supra note
27, at 14 (noting that the Sharm Al Sheikh resort added 110 hotels from the late
1990s to the early 2000s that created thirty thousand jobs, few of which were
offered to the Bedouin).
127. Revkin, supra note 73, at 46; Gilbert, Nature = Life, supra note 24, at 46.
128. Gilbert, Nature = Life, supra note 24, at 47.
129. Alexandrani, supra note 59, at 19; Revkin, supra note 73, at 47.
130. Gilbert, This Is Not Our Life. . ., supra note 27, at 11; INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra
note 79, at 8.
131. Gold, supra note 11, at 2.
132. Id. SABRY, supra note 32, at 12.
133. Mark Perry, Looking for Hashish in Cairo? Talk to the Police, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Aug. 23, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/23/looking-for-hashish-in-cairo-
talk-to-the-police/ [https://perma.unl.edu/4V7B-LZW7]; Economic Life Slows to a
Crawl Amid Crackdown in North Sinai, IRIN (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.irin-
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gime looked the other way as Sinai Bedouin and Gazans established
smuggling routes.134
As smuggling profits boomed, a new class of armed semi-criminal
kingpins arose.135  Their wealth, power, and weapons allowed them to
challenge traditional tribal leaders and centuries of tribal struc-
ture.136  As a result, smuggling has undermined tribal unity as tribal
leaders lose influence over new generations of disgruntled youth.
Moreover, the smuggling kingpins’ material interests in selling weap-
ons merged with militant groups’ political interests in attaining weap-
ons to attack the Israeli and Egyptian government.137  As the two
groups became targets of the state’s counterterrorism and antismug-
gling efforts, respectively, some Bedouin joined violent extremist
groups.138  Sinai residents, thus, have fallen victim to a cycle of vio-
lence between harsh security practices and militant groups.139
III. BRINGING THE SINAI INTO THE NATIONAL FOLD
For years, analysts have called for developing the Sinai as a means
of stabilizing the peninsula and offering its residents a life of dig-
nity.140  While the Egyptian government has undertaken development
projects in Sinai funded by USAID and the European Union (EU), the
programs are often poorly implemented due to security restrictions,
lack of technical capacity, or inadequate funding.
Two fatal flaws in the strategies that shape development projects
are worth highlighting: (1) the securitization of development and (2)
the Egyptian and foreign governments’ failure to include local
Bedouin and other Sinai leaders in the planning and implementa-
news.org/fr/report/99316/economic-life-slows-to-a-crawl-amid-crackdown-in-
north-sinai [https://perma.unl.edu/5SKX-PL47] [hereinafter Economic Life
Slows]; INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 79, at 16; SABRY, supra note 32, at 12; Gil-
bert, This Is Not Our Life . . ., supra note 27, at 18.
134. Gold, supra note 11, at 11.
135. Khalil, supra note 101.  Bedouin culture is grounded in a patrilineal and patriar-
chal tribal social structure that supports strong kinship networks.  A five-genera-
tion kinship structure known as “Khamsa” requires that the extended family
preserve the family’s honor under customary (“urfi”) law.  Gilbert, Nature = Life,
supra note 24, at 44.
136. Gold, supra note 11, at 7; Graham-Harrison, supra note 56.
137. Mokhtar Awad & Mostafa Abdou, A New Sinai Battle? Bedouin Tribes and
Egypt’s ISIS Affiliate, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (May 14, 2015), http://www.atlantic-
council.org/blogs/egyptsource/a-new-sinai-battle-bedouin-tribes-and-egypt-s-isis-
affiliate [https://perma.unl.edu/7NLD-N6XR].
138. Maram Mazen, Human Rights Watch Says Civilians Harmed as Egypt Military
Creates Northern Sinai Buffer Zone, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 22, 2015, 4:25 AM), http://
www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/09/22/rights-group-says-civilians-
harmed-in-egypts-sinai-campaign [https://perma.unl.edu/6KNS-FVJ8].
139. What Is Left of ‘October’s Sinai’?, supra note 65.
140. Khalil, supra note 101.
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tion.141  Elite government officials from Cairo and military officers,
including Sinai’s governors, negotiate the terms of the program and
wrestle with Western donors over control of the funds.142  As a result,
Sinai residents are objectified as recipients of aid who lack agency to
shape the objectives and sustainability of development programs.
The same exclusionary practices apply to Egypt’s security and mili-
tary institutions wherein Bedouin are barred from serving.143  This
sends a clear message to all Egyptians that the Bedouin are not trust-
worthy, much less equal citizens.  Furthermore, the dearth of Bedouin
in elected or appointed political office makes it all the more difficult to
use the political process to improve their circumstances.  Thus, the
crucial missing component in past development efforts is the absence
of meaningful inclusion of local leaders in the crafting and implemen-
tation of development programs from start to finish, in addition to the
de-securitization of governance in Sinai.
Although security is as much, if not more, of a concern for Sinai
residents as it is for other Egyptians, this Article does not argue that
counterterrorism should be the prism through which one views Sinai’s
problems.144  The security situation is so complex—in large part due
to securitization of development—that a holistic approach to bringing
peace and dignity to Sinai residents is warranted.145
141. See Newman, supra note 5, at 424–25.
142. Challenges of Sinai Assistance, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 15, 2011, 8:22 PM), http://www
.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/egypt-wikileaks-cables/8327191/CHAL-
LENGES-OF-SINAI-ASSISTANCE.html; Hicham Bou Nassif, Wedded to
Mubarak: The Second Careers and Financial Rewards of Egypt’s Military Elite,
1981–2011, 67 MIDDLE E.J. 509, 518 (2013) (documenting that all governors as-
signed to Sinai were former military generals); Holger Albrecht, Does Coup-
Proofing Work? Political–Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes Amid the
Arab Uprisings, 20 MEDITERRANEAN POL. 36, 45–46 (2015) (noting the governor of
South Sinai is always occupied by a retired commander of the Republican Guard).
143. Mara Revkin, Islamic Justice in the Sinai, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 11, 2013), http://
foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/11/islamic-justice-in-the-sinai/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
AXJ4-QZZA] (“Their many grievances—including legal obstacles to land owner-
ship, lack of basic public services, job discrimination, and systematic exclusion
from military and police academies—have reinforced a climate of mutual distrust
between the central government and the Sinai.”); Bedouins Begin to Demand
Equal Citizenship Rights, IRIN (June 16, 2011), http://www.irinnews.org/report/
92998/egypt-bedouins-begin-to-demand-equal-citizenship-rights [https://perma
.unl.edu/TR44-6QUP] (“[Bedouin] say they are not allowed to join the army,
study in police or military colleges, hold key government positions or form their
own political parties.”).
144. See, e.g., Chuck Hagel, A Republican Foreign Policy, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug.
2004, at 64–65 (arguing for prevention of failed states as a component of
counterterrorism).
145. Egypt’s Military Struggles with Sinai, NATION (Mar. 18, 2012), http://nation.com
.pk/international/18-Mar-2012/egypt-s-military-struggles-with-sinai [https://per
ma.unl.edu/QPW8-5DDB] (reporting local residents’ frustration that develop-
ment cannot come without security); Human Rights Report Reveals Significant
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Accordingly, this Part proffers a three-pronged approach to bring-
ing stability and prosperity to failing sub-states, both in Sinai and
other weak states that offer fertile grounds for militant groups to oper-
ate.146  First, the government should commit to a long-term, rights-
based development plan that prioritizes human development over se-
curity.147  Second, the local population should be included in local and
national governance through quotas or other forms of affirmative ac-
tion that guarantee their political representation.  Third, local re-
sidents should be recruited into the security and military forces in
sufficient numbers to inform strategy based on their knowledge of the
area and ties to the local population.  Quotas may be required in the
beginning to prevent incumbent personnel from stonewalling such di-
versification efforts.  The following sections explore these three recom-
mendations in more detail.
A. Long-Term Investment in Development
Long before Egypt’s 2011 uprisings, Sinai residents were in desper-
ate need of jobs, infrastructure, schools, and freedom from police
abuse.148  Indeed, militant groups pointed to the poverty, lack of polit-
ical agency, and state abuse to declare they were defending the popu-
lation against state oppression buttressed by Western support.149
Had gainful employment been more readily available, Sinai’s re-
sidents would not have been as dependent on black market economic
activity to survive—including weapons and drug smuggling.150  With
more schools that provided residents with quality education, militant
groups would have found it much more difficult to persuade local re-
sidents that their twisted interpretations of Islam justifies vio-
lence.151  Had state resources been spent on human development
rather than hyper-securitization, the local population would have
viewed militant groups as a threat to their material interests rather
than spokespersons for their grievances and defenders of their dignity
against state oppression.152
Junta Violations of Sinai Peninsula Civilians, IKHWAN WEB (Dec 16, 2014, 6:43
PM), http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=31936 [https://perma.unl.edu/7Y
RL-J4AR].
146. Yossef & Cerami, supra note 34, at 51.
147. This Article disagrees with the security-first, development-second approach rec-
ommended by some policy analysts. See Gold, supra note 11, at 14–15.
148. Ezzat, supra note 24.
149. See Laub, supra note 91.
150. Id.
151. Gilbert, This Is Not Our Life . . ., supra note 27, at 18.
152. Pelham, supra note 63, at 18 (“But the [security] plans were half-baked.  Egypt
cited logistical difficulties, including stony ground, which reportedly hindered the
hammering of steel plates deeper than four metres into the ground.  Tunnel oper-
ators used welding torches to cut hundreds of holes in those sections of the bar-
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Thus, when thirteen Egyptian human rights groups called for a
comprehensive approach to solving Sinai’s problems in January 2014,
they were on point when they stated:153
[A]ddressing terrorism requires that a more comprehensive vision be adopted
which confronts the religious discourse that praises terrorism.  This vision
must also take into consideration the economic, social, and political circum-
stances in which terrorism emerges and spreads.  Counterterrorism efforts
must not include arbitrary measures but rather be conducted within a frame-
work that respects the law and individual rights throughout the process of
identifying the real perpetrators.154
To be sure, the Egyptian government has attempted multiple times
to develop the Sinai.  However, the current model for development
programs in Sinai is counterproductive because it fails to address the
myriad political and social factors discussed earlier in this paper and
indirectly perpetuates the securitization of the Sinai.  As a result,
Egyptian or Western funded development initiatives become public re-
lations ploys that are poorly funded and do not benefit local
residents.155
For example, the al-Salam Canal project provided a vital water
supply to farms in Sinai that employed local residents.156  After the
government reportedly spent E£4.8 billion (U.S. $685 million), it was
abruptly ended in 2006 and transformed into an impervious dam in
rier that had been completed, or they dug deeper tunnels, nullifying the multi-
million-dollar project at a cost of a few thousand dollars.”).
153. Statement, Cairo Inst. for Hum. Rts. Stud., Rights Groups Condemn Terrorist
Explosions, Concerned by Increasing Violence and Excessive Force by Security
Forces (Jan. 25, 2014), http://www.cihrs.org/?p=7971&lang=en [https://perma.unl
.edu/D24R-PMSY].
154. Id.
155. Sinai Ignored in Egypt Development Plans, supra note 25 (“Sinai researcher Mus-
tafa Sangar told Al-Monitor that despite such a plan, the Sinai is only
remembered during national events surrounding its liberation.  ‘Talk about
mega-projects for the development of the Sinai is only banter aimed at the inhabi-
tants during national ceremonies, when the situation deteriorates in Sinai or in
the context of electoral programs during presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions.  Otherwise, there is nothing worth mentioning except for marginalization
and neglect . . . .”); Gilbert, Nature = Life, supra note 24, at 47 (“A ‘security-
fixated conception of development,’ the ICG (2007: 19) notes, ‘is accompanied by
the authorities’ declared wish to “Egyptianize” the region, not only in economic
and demographic terms, but also symbolically, in cultural and identity terms.’
Aziz (2000: 30) comments—without apparent irony—that the national project to
develop Sinai ‘never argued for the elimination of the Bedouin.’  However, devel-
opment has brought poverty and widespread decline in the core livelihoods that
long constituted Bedouin identity.  One Tarabıˆn man complained to me: ‘The gov-
ernment forces us to leave the mountains, settles us in houses like chickens and
makes us pay taxes’.”); SABRY, supra note 32, at 91 (noting failure of government’s
job-creation projects).
156. Frisch, supra note 64, at 185 (noting the military’s control over this development
project in the Sinai).
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2010.157  Farmers were let down by the government’s broken
promises.  Similarly, the Ismailiya–Rafah railway project was sup-
posed to lay tracks from al-Ferdan Bridge in Ismailiya to Bir al-Abed
in North Sinai.  Again, the government abruptly ended the project af-
ter a few months without explanation.  The iron tracks were eventu-
ally stolen by thieves.158
Under Morsi, the Egyptian government reportedly allocated $270
million toward development and infrastructure projects in Sinai for
the 2012–2013 fiscal year.159  The project was part of Morsi’s shift in
approach to engage in dialogue with tribal leaders, develop the Sinai,
and discuss the Bedouin’s longstanding request to change the land
ownership law to allow them to own and inherit land.160  The work
was to be completed through the Sinai Development Agency (SDA),
formed in January 2012 via ministerial decree and led by General
Shawky Rashwan.161
The SDA appears to be a contemporary iteration of the Sinai De-
velopment Authority established in 1974 to manage reconstruction
and development of Sinai after the 1973 war.162  The SDA was tasked
with working with USAID to manage the $50 million donated for Si-
nai development funds in 2012–2013.163  However, a former assistant
157. Sinai Ignored in Egypt Development Plans, supra note 25.
158. Id.
159. 2012-13 Budget Allocates EGP 1 Billion for Sinai Development, EGYPT ST. INFO.
SERV. (Aug. 17, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/63396?lang=en-us
[https://perma.unl.edu/5TEC-56SX].
160. Breen, supra note 34, at 78.
161. Ezzat, supra note 24; Government Earmarks LE1 bn for Sinai Development,
EGYPT INDEP. (Aug. 16, 2012, 9:43 PM), http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/
government-earmarks-le1-bn-sinai-development [https://perma.unl.edu/5RNG-K
4W9]; Waheed Abdel-Meguid, Egypt’s Sinai: Development Versus Security,
AHRAM ONLINE (Aug. 30, 2012), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsPrint/51615
.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/8S6J-RBBV].  According to a 1981 USAID Working
Paper, the Sinai Development Authority at the time was branch of the Ministry
of Development, and “responsible for implementation of many construction and
development projects in Sinai.  Its development activities cover projects in nine
sectors—housing, utilities, transport and communications, electricity, services,
trade and supply, land reclamation, new communities, and special studies.”
Dames & Moore, The Public Administration of Development in Sinai: Current
Practice iv (Advisory Comm. for Reconstruction of the Ministry of Dev., Working
Paper No. 30, 1981), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnaav226.pdf [https://perma
.unl.edu/JFW2-2NRC].
162. Dames and Moore, supra note 161, at 33–34.
163. Ezzat, supra note 24 (“The Sinai Development Authority (SDA) was established
by presidential decree in January 2012 and tasked with developing strategies to
overcome decades of central government neglect of the peninsula.  Its head, a
major general seconded from the army, was assigned four assistants, three of
them military and one, Ahmed Sakr, with a background in development.  After a
year and half of being based in north Sinai, Sakr resigned his post and resumed
his job at the Ministry of Planning.”); Government Earmarks LE1 bn for Sinai
Development, supra note 161; Abdel-Meguid, supra note 161.
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to the leadership, Ahmed Sakr, stated that after a year and a half he
resigned because “as far as I could see no serious work to promote
development in Sinai was being done.”164  The lack of political will to
develop Sinai coupled with state imposed evictions and curfews has
made the situation in Sinai untenable.  Sakr and other critics noted
the SDA’s militarized approach to development through its focus on
“cleansing Sinai of terrorists” as opposed to dealing with the local
populations’ legitimate economic and political grievances.165  Moreo-
ver, the military’s delivery of medical supplies, construction materials,
and food to North Sinai residents on the forty-second anniversary of
the October 6 War in 2015 was aimed to merely diffuse the anger of
Rafah residents expelled from their demolished homes rather than of-
fer sustainable development solutions.166
Western states have also sponsored development projects in Sinai,
due in part to policies that viewed Sinai’s underdevelopment as a
threat to America’s interests in preventing attacks against Israel.167
The USAID-funded Livelihood and Income from the Environment in
Sinai (LIFE Sinai) program, for example, financed the construction of
three water-desalination plants in three villages as a means of in-
creasing the supply of clean drinking water to dispersed Bedouin com-
munities in Central Sinai.168  A five-year project that ended in 2012,
LIFE Sinai also sought to provide Bedouin in North Sinai access to
roads and public transportation systems.169  The program’s final re-
port states the following objectives: “[n]atural resources will be man-
aged more sustainably, especially water resources[;] [b]enefits to local
communities will be demonstrated in the form of increased employ-
ment and income generation, improved physical infrastructure, diver-
sification of income resources, and increased access to community
services including health, education, and other relevant service[;]
[i]ncreased number of women participating in rural enterprises, devel-
164. Ezzat, supra note 24.
165. Walton, supra note 28, at 7; Abdel-Meguid, supra note 161 (reporting that the
police’s abusive practices in Sinai created an environment conducive to extrem-
ism); Ezzat, supra note 24.
166. See Egypt’s Army Begins Second Stage of Operation ‘Martyr’s Right’ in North Si-
nai, AHRAM ONLINE (Oct. 8, 2015), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsPrint/152407
.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/9U6X-9H5X].
167. Newman, supra note 5, at 438 (noting that resources, aid, and capacity-building
funding is directed at conflict zones that threaten Western interests).
168. Press Release, Embassy of the U.S. in Cairo, Egypt, Egyptian and US Partners to
Renovate Water Trucks to Increase Supply of Drinking Water to Central Sinai
Family (Mar. 28, 2012), http://egypt.usembassy.gov/pr032812.html [https://perma
.unl.edu/G9HR-WVMN].
169. Press Release, Embassy of the U.S. in Cairo, Egypt, Inauguration of Water
Desalination Plants to Bring Clean Water to Sinai (Dec. 27, 2011), http://egypt.us
embassy.gov/pr122611.html [https://perma.unl.edu/BT3G-CHX4].
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opment activities, and community development planning in their
communities.”170
However, the current conditions in Sinai demonstrate that these
objectives were not met.  Similarly, the EU donated C= 64 million for
the South Sinai Regional Development Program from 2006 to 2011.
The program aimed to improve the living standards of South Sinai
residents through preservation of social, cultural, and natural re-
sources.171  Toward that end, the EU provided 124 small direct grants
totaling C= 1 million to local Bedouin leaders for small projects and
funded large infrastructure projects in water, waste management, and
environmental management.172  While new and ongoing development
projects are in the works, they are unlikely to be effective so long as
Bedouin and other Sinai residents are not involved to ensure local
needs are met and local residents benefit from the development
initiatives.173
While Western-funded programs may be well intended, their im-
pact has been limited and often counterproductive.174  The Egyptian
government’s security restrictions, refusal to provide technical assis-
tance consultants with access to beneficiary Bedouin communities,
and delays in permitting feasibility studies circumscribed the pro-
170. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., supra note 25.
171. South Sinai Regional Development Programme, DELEGATION OF THE EUR. UNION
TO EGYPT, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/projects/list_of_projects/5717_
en.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/XLG4-5SNE].
172. South Sinai Regional Development Programme, TAS EUROPROJECTS, http://www
.taseuro.com/en/ict/item/27-south-sinai-regional-development-programme [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/93TK-HDLA].
173. An example of a new development project is Schnieder Electric’s plans to build a
solar energy power station project in South Sinai.  Sara Aggour, Schneider Elec-
tric to Submit Proposal for a South Sinai Solar Energy Project: Company Official,
DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/09/30/
schneider-electric-to-submit-proposal-for-a-south-sinai-solar-energy-project-com-
pany-official/ [https://perma.unl.edu/B3E8-HHRG].
174. de Graaff, supra note 6, at 22–23 (“[Western] military interventions or civil war
situations allow Islamist extremist groups to fight alongside national resistance
groups and to impose their politico-religious narrative on the national struggle.”);
Gilbert, Nature = Life, supra note 24, at 47 (“[T]hat the national project to de-
velop Sinai ‘never argued for the elimination of the Bedouin.’  However, develop-
ment has brought poverty and widespread decline in the core livelihoods that
long constituted Bedouin identity.  One Tarabıˆn man complained to me: ‘The gov-
ernment forces us to leave the mountains, settles us in houses like chickens and
makes us pay taxes[.’]  Donors collude in discouraging the remaining mobile Bedu:
the World Food Programme’s project in central South Sinai supports local people
on condition of settlement, a principle recently extended by the EU-funded South
Sinai Regional Development Programme (SSRDP).  ‘Bedouin culture’ excites no
interest except as a tourist attraction (ICG 2007: 9).  The preferred strategy has
been to subsume Bedu into mainstream pharaonic heritage in the interests of
nation-building.”).
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gram’s original goals.175  Moreover, Western donors have to work
within the confines of security-driven agendas set by government offi-
cials based in Cairo and military intelligence.  The end result has been
programs that do not address the underlying political and human
rights grievances that tie directly into the economic development and
security of Sinai.176
Accordingly, this Article proffers four recommendations to foster
sustainable development in Sinai: (1) integrate Sinai’s population and
economy into mainland Egypt and prioritize the benefits to Sinai’s res-
idence;177 (2) include Sinai residents in the local economy and devel-
opment projects; (3) de-securitize the development agenda in Sinai;
and (4) normalize and legalize trade between Gaza and Egypt to dis-
incentivize tunnel smuggling of otherwise lawful consumer goods.178
Each of these recommendations aims to remedy the principle flaw
with development in Sinai: the security-driven agenda is determined
in Cairo in collaboration with Tel Aviv and Washington D.C., with lit-
tle if any input from local Sinai residents.179  Meanwhile, the few ma-
terial benefits produced go more to mainland Egyptians than Sinai
residents.
B. De-Securitizing Development in Sinai
While the military is a stakeholder in Sinai, it should not be craft-
ing or managing development projects.180  Not only is the military un-
qualified to do so, but the generals have tainted their reputation as
the new security force that practices the same harsh tactics of
Mubarak’s Ministry of Interior and the police.181  The military is
solely focused on countering terrorism first, as opposed to develop-
175. Challenges of Sinai Assistance, supra note 142.
176. YOSSEF & CERAMI, supra note 34, at 54.
177. Khalil, supra note 101 (reporting that the average Egyptian citizen does consider
Sinai as a pressing national problem as compared to the inflationary prices of
food and gas); see also Kaplan, supra note 6, at, 58–59 (noting the importance of
unifying disparate people for prevention of a failed state).
178. Awad & Abdou, supra note 137; PELHAM, supra note 63, at 10.
179. See Mohannad Sabry, Sinai Tribal Leaders Give Morsi Ultimatum, AL-MONITOR
(Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fr/originals/2013/04/sinai-tribal-
leaders-morsi-ultimatum.html# [https://perma.unl.edu/S6T4-X3TX].
180. Nourhan Fahmy, Al-Sisi Passes Amendments to Sinai Development Law, DAILY
NEWS EGYPT (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/08/17/al-sisi-
passes-amendments-to-sinai-development-law/ [https://perma.unl.edu/B7KA-
EJQ8] (showing military’s control of development projects in Sinai); Govt Allo-
cates LE1.95 bn for Sinai Development, EGYPT INDEP. (Mar. 9, 2012, 5:29 PM),
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/govt-allocates-le195-bn-sinai-develop-
ment [https://perma.unl.edu/3ECE-8AJ3] (noting the Ministry of Defense is fund-
ing water projects and schools).
181. See, e.g., JOSHUA STACHER, ADAPTABLE AUTOCRATS: REGIME POWER IN EGYPT AND
SYRIA (2012) (discussing in detail the dominant role of the military in shaping
and controlling Egypt’s autocratic system of governance).
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ment.182  For example, the military’s Sinai development plans in
2015, ironically called “Operation Martyr’s Rights,” started with a six-
teen-day joint police and military offensive to “destroy the main hide-
outs and gathering points used by the terror and criminal elements in
Rafah, Sheikh Zuwayyed, and Arish, North Sinai.”183  Such language
is usually a euphemism for arbitrary raids of residential homes.  In-
deed, at the end of the operation on September 22, 2015, the army
announced that over 500 militants had been killed and 320 ar-
rested.184  Whether these individuals were in fact militants or inno-
cent civilians will remain unknown due to the military-imposed media
blackout.185
The government’s recent plans to build six tunnels linking Sinai to
Port Said and Ismailiya is a positive step toward physically connecting
Sinai and the rest of Egypt.186  Discussions of creating three free
trade zones in Rafah, Nuweiba, and Al Arish are also promising.187  If
these projects are in fact implemented, it will facilitate integrating the
Bedouin and Sinai into the national economy.  However, past develop-
ment projects in tourism, for example, have shown that without af-
firmative action or quotas to ensure Bedouin benefit from the
increased trade, they will remain in poverty while Nile Valley Egyp-
tians profit.  Hence, the Minister of Irrigation’s announcement that
water will be available for cultivation of 80,000 acres of land in Sinai
and Sisi’s decree allowing Egyptians to buy plots of land in Sinai may
only aggravate Bedouins’ marginalization if no quotas for Bedouin are
in place.188  Similarly, the Egyptian government should legally man-
date employment quotas for Sinai residents in the peninsula’s tourism
sector.
182. Youssef, supra note 33 (originally published on Daily News Egypt, available at
https://www.masress.com/en/dailynews/258376 [https://perma.unl.edu/KYT5-
KJHS]).
183. Egypt: Army—Main Stage of Operation Martyr’s Right Ends, Second Phase to
Begin, ALL AFRICA (Sept. 23, 2015), http://allafrica.com/stories/201509240390
.html; Egypt’s Army Begins Second Stage of Operation ‘Martyr’s Right’ in North
Sinai, supra note 166.
184. Ahmed Aboulenein & Ali Abdelaty, Egypt Says Killed 55 Militants in Sinai, Two




186. Hossam Mounir, Egypt Needs Giant Projects to Move Economy, Push Growth
Rates: Bankers, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.dailynewsegypt
.com/2015/09/11/egypt-needs-giant-projects-to-move-economy-push-growth-rates-
bankers/ [https://perma.unl.edu/6D78-QM5B].
187. Govt Allocates LE1.95 bn for Sinai Development, supra note 180.
188. Id.; Fahmy, supra note 180 (limiting land ownership in Sinai to Egyptian citizens
with Egyptian parents and requiring approval from the Ministry of Defense, Inte-
rior, and general intelligence).
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The punitive border controls between Gaza and Rafah are also
counterproductive.  Despite Egyptian and Israeli government depic-
tions of tunnel smuggling as solely a security problem, it is primarily
an economic problem.  Tunnel smuggling will decrease when con-
sumer goods can be freely traded above ground between Egypt and
Gaza.  While weapons are certainly smuggled between Sinai and
Gaza, most items that cross the border are consumer items denied
Gazan’s due to a harsh Israeli blockade.189  The demand for goods by
the 1.7 million Gazans trapped in what some have called an “open air
prison”190 is so high that Sinai residents, as well as Egyptian security
personnel, have made millions of dollars from tunnel smuggling.191
The profits from the black market are multiple times higher than the
state-sponsored projects by the Social Solidarity Ministry.192  The tun-
nel smuggling business, thus, decreased unemployment in Rafah from
50% to 20% in 2008.193  Each time the Mubarak regime (half-heart-
edly) destroyed tunnels, they were quickly rebuilt.194  Because the
black market took the pressure off of Egypt’s government to employ
and feed North Sinai further, and lined the pockets of poorly paid gov-
ernment security personnel; Mubarak’s tunnel destructions were
mostly political theater.195  Indeed, by 2011, the number of operating
tunnels reached over 1,200.196
In addition to strong economic incentives, building the tunnels is
perceived as an act of resistance to the oppression of Gazans.197  Many
Egyptians in Rafah and other border cities belong to the same fami-
lies, clans, or tribes as Palestinians in Gaza.  They are well-informed
of the severe economic hardships and human rights violations arising
from Israeli policies and military actions in Gaza.  Similarly, when
Sisi’s regime bulldozed over a thousand homes, making thousands of
Rafah citizens homeless, the cross-border harms and grievances were
aggravated.  Coupled with the neglect and abuse of their own govern-
ment, the border between North Sinai and Gaza becomes meaningless
189. SABRY, supra note 32, at 88.
190. David Cameron Describes Blockaded Gaza as a ‘Prison’, BBC NEWS (July 27,
2010), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-10778110 [https://perma.unl
.edu/9RUV-WC2H] (“ ‘Gaza cannot and must not be allowed to remain a prison
camp,’ Mr Cameron said.  ‘People in Gaza are living under constant attacks and
pressure in an open-air prison,’ he said.”).
191. SABRY, supra note 32, at 92–93; Yaari, supra note 113, at 14.
192. SABRY, supra note 32, at 92–94.
193. Id. at 97.
194. Id. at 89–90, 99 (noting that the punishment for illegally crossing the border was
two years in prison while smuggling legal items imposed a fine not to exceed 2000
LE).
195. Id. at 99–100.
196. Id. at 106.
197. Id. at 94.
338 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:307
in forming group identities of residents of Rafah and Gaza.198  All of
which makes Sinai less, not more, safe.
The treatment of North Sinai as a military zone rather than the
residence of over 200,000 people nearly guarantees minimal develop-
ment.  It is long overdue for Israel and Egypt, with the assistance of
objective, Western state mediators, to renegotiate the Egyp-
tian–Israeli Treaty and their border policies to make them more con-
ducive to economic development.  The more impoverished (and
abused) the local population in North Sinai and Gaza, the less secure
Egypt and Israel will be.  To be sure, such an endeavor is fraught with
complexity and cannot be undertaken without considering the serious
threat from Wilayat Sinai and other militant groups.  However, with
the assistance of the local population as partners, not foes, there is
cause for optimism.  First, the Bedouin and other Sinai residents must
be integrated into Egypt’s political community through elections and
political appointments.
C. Political Inclusion and Integrating Bedouin into Security
Services
Many Egyptians view Sinai as a separate state about which they
know very little.  Government-controlled media manipulates domestic
coverage of Sinai to suit the regime’s political interests.  Specifically,
Sinai residents and the Bedouin in particular are portrayed as primi-
tive, criminal, and culturally different than mainland Egyptians.199  A
few roads and expensive air travel are the only means to travel to and
from Sinai, making it less likely for mainland Egyptians and Sinai
residents to interact socially or conduct intrastate business.  The Si-
nai’s geographic and cultural disconnectedness from the Egyptian
mainland enhances its isolation from society.
Prior to 2007, Sinai’s Bedouin did not have the right to vote.200
Nor did they have the right to run for political office.201  As a result,
the representatives of the Sinai governorates were not from Sinai,202
and the president appointed governors from among his political loyal-
ists in mainland Egypt.203  These political representatives subject the
198. Id. at 130–31.
199. Ezzat, supra note 24.
200. Walton, supra note 28, at 7; Gilbert, This Is Not Our Life . . ., supra note 27, at
7–32.
201. Walton, supra note 28, at 7; Gilbert, This Is Not Our Life . . ., supra note 27, at
7–32.
202. Sinai is composed of two governorates: North Sinai and South Sinai.  Each
governorate is composed of markaz that are composed of municipalities and vil-
lages.  North Sinai, for example, has four markaz, nine municipalities, and six
villages.  Dames & Moore, supra note 161, at 17–18.
203. Kareem Fahim, Egyptian Officials Fired over Soldiers’ Killings in Sinai, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 8, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/world/middleeast/
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Bedouin and other Sinai residents to policies created by a centralized
government based in Cairo that treats them as second-class citi-
zens.204  Hence, locally based political representation of Sinai is a pre-
requisite for development programs to be effective.  I propose this can
be accomplished in at least five ways: quotas, local councils, political
appointment of Sinai residents, recruiting Bedouin into the military
and police, and amending the public education curriculum to depict
Bedouin culture as part of the Egyptian national identity.205
First, quotas in parliament should be reserved by law for Bedouin
and other Sinai residents to represent their districts.206  Quotas are
not foreign to Egypt’s electoral system.  Prior to the 2011 uprisings,
sixty-four seats in the lower house of parliament were reserved for
women due to structural gender biases that impeded women from be-
ing elected to office.207  In 2015, election laws were amended to man-
date the following quota for each closed party list in districts with
fifteen seats: three seats for Christians, two seats for individuals who
are farmers or workers, two seats for youth aged twenty-five to thirty-
five, one seat for a person with a disability, and one seat for an Egyp-
tian living abroad.208  In districts with forty-five seats, the quota num-
egypt-sinai-attacks.html (reporting that North Sinai governor at the time, Sayyid
Abdul Wahab Mabrouk, was despised by local residents for his brutality and neg-
lect); Nassif, supra note 142, at 518 (documenting that all governors assigned to
Sinai were former military generals).
204. NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB BASIC
LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT 119 (2002); Gilbert &
al Jebaali, supra note 112, at 3.
205. Gilbert & al Jebaali, supra note 112, at 8 (citations omitted) (“Distrust is height-
ened in South Sinai by perceptions of identity arising from the state’s intention to
‘Egyptianize’ Sinai . . . .  South Sinai Bedu, of course, are all Egyptian citizens,
despite a widespread sense among Egyptians that they are ‘Other’: ‘uncivilized
and unskilled.’ . . .  Egyptian officials, according to Gardner . . . , ‘can treat the
Bedouins with mistrust at best, or contempt at worst.’”).
206. The new parliamentary election law allocates six seats to North Sinai and four
seats to South Sinai.  Pesha Magid, Elections Explainer: A Map to the Madness,
MADA MASR (Oct. 16, 2015, 8:12 PM), http://www.madamasr.com/sections/polit-
ics/elections-explainer-map-madness [https://perma.unl.edu/8RHT-WQJX]. See
generally Khaled A. Beydoun, Fast-Tracking Women into Parliamentary Seats in
the Arab World, 17 SW. J. INT’L L. 63, 101 (2011) (for a comparative argument on
gender, where the author recommends robust, fast-track quotas as a means to
integrate more Arab woman into state parliaments).
207. Adam Morrow, Egypt: Disputes Rise over Quotas for Women MPs, INTER PRESS
SERV. (July 27, 2009), http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/07/egypt-disputes-rise-over-
quotas-for-women-mps/ [https://perma.unl.edu/8RNA-E5T9].
208. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 2014, art. 180; INT’L FOUND. FOR
ELECTORAL SYS., ELECTIONS IN EGYPT 2015 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELEC-
TIONS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 3 (2015), http://www.ifes.org/sites/default/
files/2015_ifes_egypt_hor_elections_faq_final.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/K4BE-
BNPX]; Ahmed Morsy, The Egyptian Parliamentary Elections 101, MIDDLE E.
INST. (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.mei.edu/content/article/egyptian-parliamen-
tary-elections-101 [https://perma.unl.edu/9GGP-KGB5]; Sahar F. Aziz, Revolu-
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bers are tripled for each category.  Moreover, the President can
appoint Bedouin within his authority to appoint 5% of parliamentary
seats, which comprise twenty-eight seats of the parliament.209  I ar-
gue that only Sinai residents should be permitted to run for parlia-
mentary seats representing North and South Sinai, and voters should
have a process for challenging candidates who falsify their residency.
Notably, the most recent parliamentary elections in 2015 are a
promising step toward political inclusiveness.  For example, in the
run-offs of the second phase of the elections for the Al-Arish seats,
candidates from North Sinai Bedouin tribes competed with candidates
from Upper Egyptian families living in Sinai.210  South Sinai was also
among the governorates with the highest voter turnout at 41% com-
pared to 28% nationwide, due in large part to clan and tribal mobiliza-
tion in favor of particular candidates.211
A second avenue for local political participation in governance is
local councils.  Article 180 of Egypt’s 2014 Constitution establishes
elected local councils of which 25% must be allocated to youth between
the ages of twenty-one and thirty-five, 25% allocated to women, and at
least 50% allocated to workers and farmers.212  Although the Consti-
tution grants the local councils the authority to implement national
development plans in their respective jurisdiction, Egypt’s highly cen-
tralized government based in Cairo impedes local councils’ ability to
carry out that mandate.  Thus, policy makers should amend applicable
laws to grant local councils meaningful governance authority as well
as ensuring Bedouin are adequately represented in Sinai’s local
councils.213
Third, the president should appoint the governors of Sinai prov-
inces from among the local population based on leadership experience
tion Without Reform? A Critique of Egypt’s Elections Laws, 45 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L. REV. 1 (2013).
209. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 2014, art. 102.
210. Salma Abdallah, Election Run-off Proceeds in North Sinai Amid Fierce Competi-
tion, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/12/
01/election-run-off-proceeds-in-north-sinai-amid-fierce-competition/ [https://per
ma.unl.edu/M6LY-9YTH] (reporting that Ibrahim Mohamed Abu Sheirand
Hegazy Saeed secured seats in Sinai in the first round of parliamentary
elections).
211. Ayah Aman, Sisi Supporters Secure Second-Round Elections Victory, AL-MONI-
TOR (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/12/egypt-par-
liamentary-elections-president-sisi-supporters.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
SBP7-XG59]; Egypt’s Elections Committee Announces Final Parliamentary Re-
sults, AHRAM ONLINE (Dec. 18, 2015), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsPrint/1738
77.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/7SYT-96MJ]; Amira El-Fekki, Election Results for
Second Phase Announced, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.daily
newsegypt.com/2015/12/04/election-results-for-second-phase-announced/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/DY4M-86JS].
212. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 2014, art. 18.
213. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 2014, art. 180.
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and credibility among the constituency.214  In Egypt, governors are
appointed by the president, and have historically been retired military
generals and elite businessmen.215  Military and security personnel
should not serve as governors, but rather work with the civilian gover-
nor to transition Sinai out of its failing status into a stable, developed
region.
Fourth, the Bedouins’ inclusion in politics should extend to the po-
lice and military.  Few Bedouin serve in the military or are accepted
into the police.216  Indeed, prior to September 2011 the military train-
ing college in Cairo did not accept Bedouin from the Sinai.217  This
exclusion reinforces the perceptions that the Bedouin are not part of
the Egyptian national identity because their loyalties are suspect.
Their absence also adversely affects the efficacy of security efforts.
For instance, Egyptian police and military have admitted their unfa-
miliarity with Central Sinai’s complex topography, and as a conse-
quence, their inability to effectively secure the peninsula from
militant groups.218  Meanwhile, militant groups recruit Bedouin
trackers to assist them in evading Egyptian security.  Thus, the
Bedouin are a valuable resource that could be used in pursuit of peace,
if the state changed its approach from systemic mistreatment to re-
spect and equal citizenship rights.219
214. The North Sinai governor as of the time of the writing of this article in December
2015 was Abdel Fattah Harhour, who has a military background.  Abdallah,
supra note 210.  Sarah El-Sheikh, Government Reshuffle Features Al-Sisi Ap-
pointments with Military Backgrounds, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Dec. 26, 2015), http://
www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/12/26/government-reshuffle-features-al-sisi-ap-
pointments-with-military-backgrounds/ [https://perma.unl.edu/ZFT5-SP7V]
(“There have been no changes in the rest of the 16 governorates, including Cairo,
which is presided over by Governor Galal Said, or the governors of North Sinai
and South Sinai, Abdel Fattah Harhour and Khaled Fouda respectively, both of
whom have military background.”); Josh Lyons & Nadim Houry, “Look for An-
other Homeland”: Forced Evictions in Egypt’s Rafah, HUMAN RTS. WATCH, https://
www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/22/look-another-homeland/forced-evictions-egypts-
rafah [https://perma.unl.edu/6L3G-CR27].
215. See, e.g., Nassif, supra note 142, at 509 (documenting that most governors
throughout Mubarak’s era were former military generals or police officers).
216. Revkin, supra note 143 (“Their many grievances—including legal obstacles to
land ownership, lack of basic public services, job discrimination, and systematic
exclusion from military and police academies—have reinforced a climate of mu-
tual distrust between the central government and the Sinai.”); Bedouins Begin to
Demand Equal Citizenship Rights, supra note 143 (“[Bedouins] say they are not
allowed to join the army, study in police or military colleges, hold key government
positions or form their own political parties.”).
217. Breen, supra note 34, at 40.
218. See Sally Khalifa Isaac, Fighting Terrorism in Sinai: Effects on Regional Security
4 (Dec. 7, 2014) (unpublished paper) (on file with author); Sinai: The Challenges
Ahead, AL-AHRAM WKLY. (Feb. 5, 2015), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/10379/
17/Sinai—The-challenges-ahead.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/H79E-HG7U].
219. Awad & Abdou, supra note 137.
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To be sure, the mistrust between the security forces and Bedouin is
mutual.  The state, therefore, will need to create quotas reserved for
Bedouin in the military and police to overcome internal resistance.
Police and military school curriculum should also include courses di-
rectly aimed at humanizing Bedouin and Sinai residents and coun-
tering negative stereotypes that they are criminals and disloyal.220
To persuade Bedouin that joining the security forces will not result in
being tasked with oppressing their fellow tribesmen, security policies
and practices must be reformed to respect human rights and due
process.
Finally, the national education curriculum should be amended to
counter the stereotypes that Bedouin are primitive, violent, and crimi-
nal.  Egyptian identity should clearly include the Bedouin of Sinai and
North Egypt as equal citizens of the state, and educate students about
their unique contributions to Egypt.221  Without an affirmative effort
by the state to counter the negative stereotypes and include the
Bedouin in the national narrative of Egyptian citizenship, the
Bedouin will continue to experience the adverse effects of prejudice by
both private citizens and state institutions.  And Sinai will continue to
be an unstable region as a result.
IV. CONTEXTUALIZING SINAI’S TRANSITION INTO
A FAILING SUB-STATE
Weak states exist when the central government lacks the capacity
to “control public order within its territory, is unable to consistently
control its borders, cannot reliably maintain viable public institutions
or services, and is vulnerable to extraconstitutional domestic chal-
lenges.”222  Failed states occur when the government “is completely
unable to maintain public services, institutions, or authority, and that
central control over territory does not exist.”223  With those definitions
in mind, this Article proffers that Sinai is a failing sub-state224 whose
hyper-securitization coupled with pervasive poverty and political dis-
enfranchisement has bred a potent insurgency of militant groups.225
220. Yossef, supra note 112.
221. Mai Serhan, The Politics of Image: The Bedouins of South Sinai, JADALIYYA (June
26, 2012), http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6101/the-politics-of-image_the-
bedouins-of-south-sina [https://perma.unl.edu/B5YP-JNE4].
222. Newman, supra note 5, at 422.
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Mair, supra note 1, at 52–55 (arguing for the need to focus on failing,
rather than failed, states).
225. But see, Logan & Preble, supra note 7, at 62 (disagreeing with the position that
terrorism at its root is a result of poverty that can be eradicated by development,
and instead supporting the view that terrorism is a response of political griev-
ances).  This Article takes the position that political grievances and poverty can-
not so easily be separated, and that the former is often a product of the latter.
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In short, Sinai is a conflict zone where rule of law and security are in
short supply.226
Sinai’s current state of lawlessness did not occur overnight.  Since
Egypt regained control of the peninsula in 1982, underlying economic
and political conditions have deteriorated, resulting in waves of vio-
lence in the mid-1990s and early 2000s.227  Each time violent extrem-
ism rose, the Egyptian state aggressively reacted through harsh
security measures that collectively punished the local population.
Hundreds of local informants worked with the security forces, often
coercively under threat of torture, to spy on indigenous resistance
movements.228  Negative stereotypes of Bedouin as criminals and trai-
tors animated the state’s crackdown as thousands of local residents
were arrested, tortured, and prosecuted.229  Many of them entered jail
as innocent bystanders only to be radicalized inside prison.230  The
government was more concerned with preventing attacks on the main-
land and South Sinai’s tourist destinations than long-term solutions
to underlying economic and social problems engendering the nonstate
violence.231
Repressive state practices combined with the Sinai’s remote and
rough terrain gave rise to a mix of ideological militants seeking to
overthrow the Egyptian regime.232  The militant groups’ membership
is composed primarily of Sinai residents and mainland Egyptians with
a few foreign fighters.  In addition, the militant groups have secured
assistance from some Bedouin in creating hideouts in Sinai’s rough
terrain.233  As the indigenous people of Sinai, the Bedouin’s mastery
226. Newman, supra note 5, at 431 (“[W]eak . . . states . . . provide an environment
conducive to the emergences or operation of terrorist organizations which may
target local or international interests”).
227. Khalil al-Anani, ISIS Enters Egypt, FOREIGN AFF. (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www
.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-12-04/isis-enters-egypt [https://per
ma.unl.edu/HZ85-2EAP].
228. SABRY, supra note 32, at 14.
229. Breen, supra note 34, at 74–75.
230. Awad & Abdou, supra note 137 (arguing the deplorable conditions in prison cou-
pled with human rights violations of prisoners facilitated militant groups’ re-
cruitment of prisoners); SABRY, supra note 32, at 28; Borzou Daragahi, This Is
How ISIS Spread Beyond Syria and Iraq, BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 12, 2015, 9:01
AM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/borzoudaragahi/this-is-how-isis-has-spread-be-
yond-syria-and-iraq [https://perma.unl.edu/RU5J-3VVA].
231. Gold, supra note 11, at 19.
232. What Is Left of ‘October’s Sinai’?, supra note 65.
233. Gold, supra note 11, at 6 (noting that tribal leaders do not encourage violent ex-
tremism because the Islamist insurgency is challenging the Bedouin tribal struc-
ture); Al-Qaeda’s Expansion in Egypt: Implications for U.S. Homeland Security:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the Comm.
on Homeland Security House of Representatives, 113th Cong. 5–9 (2014) (State-
ment of Steven A. Cook, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern
Studies, Council on Foreign Relations) [hereinafter Al-Qaeda’s Expansion in
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of the region is unmatched.  Without the Bedouin’s assistance, neither
can the militant groups hide nor can the security forces apprehend the
militants.
Were the Bedouin treated with dignity as citizens with equal
rights, they would have been more likely to view the militants as a
threat to their nation’s stability.  Instead, many tribes see themselves
as independent agents whose primary means of economic survival is
through illicit smuggling and extracting protection money from mili-
tant groups.234
A. Festering Grievances and Militants in Sinai Before the
2011 Uprisings
The growing presence (and lethality) of militant insurgent groups
in Sinai has created both peril and opportunity for the Bedouin.
Bedouin’s interactions with the militant groups tend to fall within one
of four categories: (1) Bedouin who reject them altogether and are vic-
timized by their violence; (2) Bedouin (predominantly youth) who join
the groups out of despair or revenge for the police or military who
killed their relatives; (3) Bedouin who have adopted the ideology of the
militants that use religion to justify overthrowing an oppressive re-
gime; and (4) Bedouin who earn an income by serving as guides to the
militants in hiding from the police or military.  I proffer that the ma-
jority of Bedouin fall into categories one, two, and four; thereby leav-
ing a small minority who join militant groups out of ideological or
religious commitment.  As such, development-driven responses to Si-
nai’s security crisis should take into account the Bedouin’s disparate
relationships with the militants by focusing on providing economic
and political empowerment, which can be a potent means of weaken-
ing militant groups’ ability to operate in Sinai.
Sinai’s terrain is anything but friendly.  Treacherous desert topog-
raphy combined with steep and cavernous mountains offer ample op-
portunities for militant groups to hide.235  Without the assistance of
the local Bedouin tribes, the Egyptian state cannot ferret out militant
groups.  However, militarized policies have alienated and impover-
ished the Bedouin to such an extent that they assist militant groups in
evading the security services in exchange for fees.236  For instance,
Egypt] (noting that Egyptian fighters returning from Iraq and Syria are responsi-
ble for most of the violence).
234. Graham-Harrison, supra note 56.
235. Leena ElDeeb, A Walk to Revive South Sinai’s Tourism, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Nov.
18, 2014), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/11/18/walk-revive-south-sinais-
tourism/ [https://perma.unl.edu/355S-V9H7].
236. Breen, supra note 34, at 55 (interviewing FJP members in the Morsi regime who
found that the Bedouin’s feelings of alienation and political oppression motivated
some of them to turn to the use of violence).
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the large and influential Tarabin tribe inhabits the territory in the
rocky area of Jabal Halal where militants hide in the rugged moun-
tainous area.237  Other tribes such as the Sawarka and Remeilat play
a major role in operating networks of human, drug, and arms traffick-
ing trade crossing their land.238
Feeling little attachment to an Egyptian identity that has rejected
them, some Bedouin tribes have no choice but to function as smug-
glers, protectors, and guides for economic survival.239  In contrast,
some of the tribes near Nuweiba, Sharm Al Sheikh, and Dahab who
profit from the tourist industry (albeit disproportionately less than the
regime’s Cairene crony capitalists) are more willing to cooperate with
the Egyptian government to stop terrorism.240  Hence, giving the
Bedouin a stake in the economic development of Sinai appears to con-
tribute toward decreasing violence.
Ideologically driven violence intersects with economically driven il-
licit activity to produce multiple militant groups operating out of the
Sinai.  The current landscape of Islamist opposition includes four
types of groups: (1) Sinai-based militant groups affiliated with the Is-
lamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS); (2) mainland-based militant
groups self-described as Salafi and affiliated with Al Qaeda; (3) Gaza-
based militant groups affiliated with Hamas; and (4) mainland-based
groups comprised largely of disaffected Muslim Brotherhood mem-
bers.241  Although not all of the groups engage in violence, they agree
that the Egyptian regime is illegitimate.  Notably, militant Salafi
groups oppose the Muslim Brotherhood as a co-opted organization
whose ideology of political participation and incremental change is an-
tithetical to the violent groups’ political aims to overthrow the re-
gime.242  The Egyptian government’s conflation of the Muslim
Brotherhood with Salafi militant groups in Sinai, thus, is based more
237. Ronen, supra note 64, at 304.
238. Id. at 306; SABRY, supra note 32, at 18.
239. ElDeeb, supra note 235.
240. Ronen, supra note 64, at 304.
241. MOKHTAR AWAD & MASTAFA HASHEM, CARNEGIE MIDDLE E. CTR., EGYPT’S ESCA-
LATING ISLAMIST INSURGENCY (2015), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_
58_Egypt_Awad_Hashem_final.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/RDF9-V8KC]; NA-
THAN BROWN & MICHELE DUNNE, CARNEGIE MIDDLE E. CTR., UNPRECEDENTED
PRESSURES, UNCHARTED COURSE FOR EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, (2015),
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP248-EgyptMB_BrownDunne_final.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/XJ6M-2T3P] (noting younger Muslim Brotherhood mem-
bers are disaffected and some are joining Sinai-based militant groups).
242. Awad & Hashem, supra note 241; SABRY, supra note 32, at 132; Ezzat, supra note
24; FRANC¸OIS BURGAT, ISLAMISM IN THE SHADOW OF AL-QAEDA 25 (Patrick Hutch-
inson trans., 2008).
346 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:307
in political agendas to discredit the Muslim Brotherhood as the politi-
cal opposition than in efforts to decrease violence in Egypt.243
The militant Salafi movement that began in Afghanistan in the
1980s actively looked for areas where repressive regimes alienated lo-
cal populations.  The movement sent foreign fighters to join local fight-
ers with the aim of portraying the political conflict in religious
terms.244  In the 1980s and 1990s, Salafi groups gained strength in
the Northern Sinai towns in the forty kilometer stretch from Al-Arish
to the eastern Sinai border where security forces have multiple check-
points.245  Interactions with security forces checkpoints are often hu-
miliating, or worse, turn violent for local residents.246  Terrorist
recruitment strategies, thus, target people who seek revenge for de-
tained or killed family members by state security forces crack-
downs.247  In South Sinai, militant groups leveraged the influx of
Western tourists whose behavior was deemed offensive to conserva-
tive Egyptian cultural and moral values as justification for attacks on
Western hotels.248  Sinai’s border with Israel also attracted militants
opposed to the Israeli–Egyptian peace treaty.249
Local residents and Egyptian fighters returning from Iraq and
Syria coalesced into various groups, some of whom actively engaged in
violence while others called for violent uprising against the state with-
243. Gold, supra note 11, at 8; Brown & Dunne, supra note 241 (“[T]he state campaign
against the Brotherhood, including threatening to carry out death sentences
against members that were passed before the attacks.  This has happened despite
the government’s failure to make public any evidence of a connection between the
[Muslim Brotherhood] and the attacks.”); Ahmed Eleiba, Security Imperatives in
Sinai, AL-AHRAM WKLY. (Feb. 5, 2015), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/10333/
17/Security-imperatives-in-Sinai.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/7M3K-F4GC] (“In
more recent speeches he has been more explicit about elements of the organiza-
tion.  He claimed that there are links between the Muslim Brotherhood and Sinai
extremist groups.  Al-Sisi has also said that foreign powers are helping the mili-
tants with intelligence, and the planning and funding of operations.”); Egypt PM
Labels Brotherhood ‘Terrorist’ Group After Bomb Kills 14, DAWN (Dec. 24, 2013,
8:08 AM), http://www.dawn.com/news/1076098/egypt-pm-labels-brotherhood-ter-
rorist-group-after-bomb-kills-14 [https://perma.unl.edu/4LE9-3Y2N].
244. Steven Metz, Strategic Horizons: Sinai Is the Next Big Jihadist Battle, WORLD
POL. REV. (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13146/stra-
tegic-horizons-sinai-is-the-next-big-jihadist-battle [https://perma.unl.edu/63N9-
3866]; Laub, supra note 91.
245. Ronen, supra note 64, at 305; Ezzidin, supra note 30.
246. Ezzidin, supra note 30.
247. Recruitment strategies focus on people who have lost family members to state
security forces crackdowns seeking revenge.  Revkin, supra note 26.
248. Id. at 48 (noting the Al Gamaa’a Al Islamiyaa’s message to its followers that tour-
ism brings corruption and bad morals to Egypt).
249. Awad & Hashem, supra note 241.
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out taking credit for any particular attacks.250  Tawhid wal Jihad was
the most violent Sinai-based militant groups in the decade preceding
the 2011 uprisings.  Formed in 2002 by Khalid Al-Masa’id and Nasr
Khamis Al-Mallahy, the group was nearly quashed after a harsh se-
curity crackdown in 2006.  Tawhid wal Jihad rejected the Camp David
Accords and MFO as illegitimate and sought to overthrow the Egyp-
tian regime.251  The group relied on a network of disaffected Bedouin
and Sinai youth of Palestinian origin in North Sinai.252  They report-
edly recruited in mosques scattered across Al-Arish and other North-
ern Sinai towns where local discontent runs high.253
Tawhid wal Jihad claimed responsibility for the wave of terrorism
in Sinai that occurred from 2004 to 2006.  The group targeted tourist
resorts in South Sinai and killed over 150 Egyptians and foreigners
with the intent of harming Egypt’s tourism, a major source of income
in Egypt.254  In October 2004, three bombs were detonated in Taba,
Nuweiba, and Ras al-Shitan on the Red Sea, killing 34 people and in-
juring nearly 150.255  A month later, two roadside bombs hit an MFO
bus, injuring two Canadians.256  The following year in July 2005, si-
multaneous bomb attacks occurred in Sharm El-Sheikh killing more
than 88 people.  In April 2006, 23 people were killed in bomb attacks
in Dahab.257  After each attack, more police were deployed to Sinai
who escalated the violence through aggressive crackdowns.
Thousands of Sinai residents were arbitrarily arrested in dragnet
counterterrorism operations.258  Police went as far as arresting wo-
men and children as a bargaining chip to secure the surrender of the
male tribal member—an unforgivable and unforgettable violation of
250. Al-Qaeda’s Expansion in Egypt, supra note 233, at 5–9 (Statement of Steven A.
Cook, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on
Foreign Relations).
251. INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 79; Matthew Teague, The Sinai, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
(Mar. 2009), http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2009/03/sinai/teague-text/1
[https://perma.unl.edu/N3MV-9JA9].
252. Ronen, supra note 64, at 302; Abdulrahman al-Masri, Michele Chabin, Mona
Alami & Sarah Lynch, Al-Qaeda Hasn’t Gone Away, and Is Gaining, USA TODAY
(Jan. 8, 2014, 9:29 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/01/07/
al-qaeda-spread/4358845 [https://perma.unl.edu/SPU4-NTJK].
253. Ronen, supra note 64, at 308; Abdullah Al-Arian, Between Terror and Tyranny:
Political Islam in the Shadow of the Arab Uprisings, MIDDLE E. RES. AND INFO.
PROJECT (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.merip.org/mero/mero123015 [https://perma
.unl.edu/76WZ-689A] (“Islamist movements throughout the Arab world became
increasingly likely to adapt their missions to local conditions.”).
254. Egypt: Systematic Abuses in the Name of Security, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 11, 2007),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE12/001/2007/en/ [https://perma.unl
.edu/4B2E-E44D].
255. SABRY, supra note 32, at 23.
256. Ruben Tuitel, The Future of the Sinai Peninsula, Q.J., Spring 2014, at 79, 81.
257. Egypt: Systematic Abuses in the Name of Security, supra note 254.
258. Gold, supra note 11, at 8; Khalil, supra note 101.
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tribal traditions.259  These shortsighted securitized approaches to
counterterrorism ultimately pushed residents to join militant groups,
thereby making Sinai less safe in the long run.
Although Tawhid wal Jihad was significantly weakened by the end
of the Mubarak regime, some of its members escaped from jail during
the 2011 uprisings and reportedly resumed attacking police stations
and other state institutions.260  Others joined the new and heavily
armed militant groups now affiliated with ISIS.  Local grievances fa-
cilitate Bedouin recruitment or assistance for attacks against the mili-
tary, security personnel, government officials, and most recently in
November 2015 a Russian civilian aircraft flying out of Sharm El
Sheikh.261
Another Sinai-based militant group is Jaysh Al Islam (also known
as the Army of Islam), which was allegedly affiliated with Al Qaeda
and maintained strong ties with Tawhid wal Jihad.262  Established in
2006 in Gaza by Mumtaz Dughmush who broke off from the Popular
Resistance Committees, the group exploits grievances of Palestinians
in Gaza and Bedouin in Sinai to conduct cross border attacks against
Israeli and Egyptian targets.263  For example, the Egyptian govern-
ment blamed the group for an attack on a Christian church in Alexan-
dria on New Year’s Eve in 2011 and an attack on Egyptian army
soldiers breaking fast in Sinai in August 2012.264  Some scholars attri-
bute the willingness of Bedouin youth to join the group to their dismal
socioeconomic conditions, hatred for the Egyptian regime, and expo-
sure to extremist Salafi ideology on the internet.265  In September
2015, the Jaysh Al Islam reportedly pledged allegiance to Wilayat
Sinai.266
259. SABRY, supra note 32, at 24.
260. Gold, supra note 11, at 9.
261. Yossef, supra note 112; Fiona Keating, Russian Plane Crash: Leader Of Sinai
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TIMES (Nov. 8, 2015, 2:06 PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/russian-plane-crash-
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(quoting the former head of CIA counterterrorism center, Paul Pillar, stating that
most terrorists are adult men who are “unemployed or underemployed (except by
terrorist groups), with weak social and familial support, and with poor prospects
for economic improvement or advancement through legitimate work.”).
262. Ronen, supra note 64, at 308–09.
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terror-groups/jaysh-al-islam/ [https://perma.unl.edu/FQ2K-23RZ].
265. Ronen, supra note 64, at 308–09. But see Breen, supra note 34, at 61–62 (inter-
viewing members of the FJP who claimed secret documents were found in the
state security offices proving that the bombing was ordered by the former Minis-
ter of Interior Habib Al Adly).
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The Egyptian government responded to the wave of attacks by
banning the Bedouin from economic activity in Sharm El Sheikh and
rounded up thousands of detainees.267  Egypt’s emergency law
granted the government the authority to detain them for months with-
out criminal charges.  The hundreds who were not charged with a
crime languished for years in administrative detention along with
nearly 18,000 other Egyptian administrative detainees held in inhu-
mane conditions across the country.268  Detainees were tortured and
subjected to cruel and degrading treatment.269  Hundreds fell ill to
tuberculosis and other diseases that spread due to a lack of hygiene
and medical care, overcrowding, and poor food in prisons.270  Many of
the detainees were innocent Sinai residents who became radicalized in
prison and later joined militant groups.271  The systematic human
rights abuse triggered a vicious cycle of extremism and revenge-seek-
ing violence.272
These mass roundups brought relations between the Bedouin and
the state to the lowest point in decades.  Indeed, the International Cri-
sis Group described the North Sinai governorate as being “under a
quasi-state of siege.”273  It was not until 2010 that Egyptian officials
half-heartedly attempted to salvage relations with Bedouin tribes by
releasing 200 Bedouin activists arrested in the security sweeps.274  By
then, however, the environment was fertile for new militant groups to
leverage the deep seated resentment against security forces in the po-
litical vacuum that ensued after January 2011.  The 2011 uprisings
provided the opportunity both for Sinai residents to expel the loathed
security forces and militant groups to amass weapons in furtherance
of their insurgent objectives.
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B. 2011 Uprisings Create a Security and Political Vacuum
Notwithstanding the government’s differential treatment of Sinai,
the local population’s response to the 2011 uprising mirrored Egyp-
tians in other parts of the country.  After decades of political oppres-
sion, security abuses, and economic deprivation, Sinai residents joined
the nationwide protests against the corrupt Mubarak regime.275  Se-
curity personnel were the primary targets of the people’s wrath.276
Police stations were burned down and police officers were run out of
villages under threat of physical attack.277  The State Security Inves-
tigations compounds, often referred to as torture factories, were at-
tacked with rocket-propelled grenades.278  Local tribes and leaders
took control of state institutions as the Egyptian government’s atten-
tion was focused on Cairo.279  Bedouin seeking the release of their
jailed tribesmen, whom they believed were wrongfully detained in pre-
2011 roundups, sieged an MFO camp for eight days and kidnapped
tourists and foreign workers.280  These hardline tactics by residents,
coupled with the military’s attempts to improve relations with Sinai
residents, resulted in the pardoning of eighteen Bedouin sentenced in
absentia by military tribunals and new trials ordered for five Bedouin
accused of bombing Sinai resorts in 2004.281
Although the state’s absence granted local residents de facto self-
governance, it also strengthened militant groups.282  Thousands of
Egyptian fighters abroad, previously barred from entering Egypt
under threat of prosecution, returned to the Sinai after the Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) lifted their names from security
watch lists at national entry ports.283  They were joined by some of the
22,000 prisoners who escaped from at least five Egyptian jails in the
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276. Gold, supra note 11, at 6.
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maker.  Ahmed Eleiba, Hatem Maher & Sherif Tarek, ‘Operation Eagle’ Will Not
Stop Until Sinai Is Terror-Free: Egypt’s Military, AHRAM ONLINE (Aug. 8, 2012),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsPrint/49956.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/N5WJ-
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mayhem of the eighteen-day uprisings in 2011.284  Making matters
worse, the revolution next door in Libya exposed Egypt’s western bor-
der to unprecedented levels of arms smuggling.285  Anticipating the
eventual return of the security forces, the Bedouin in Sinai stockpiled
weapons.286
Confronted with rising violence in Sinai, Mohamed Morsi’s regime
promised to make Sinai a pillar of his Nahda (“renaissance”) pro-
gram.287  In his first month in office in July 2012, Morsi paid a visit to
Sinai during which he promised new relations and increased develop-
ment.288  No sooner had he returned to Cairo, Morsi faced a political
crisis when thirty-five armed militants attacked a Rafah border post
in August 2012 killing sixteen Egyptian soldiers, seizing two Egyptian
armored vehicles, and storming the border fence with Israel.289  The
crisis provided Morsi with an opportunity to arrange the retirement of
longstanding Minister of Defense General Hussein Al Tantawi and
Army Chief of Staff Sami Anan, and promote General Abdel-Fatah Al
Sisi as the new Minister of Defense—who would depose Morsi one
year later.290
The newly elected Morsi regime, in coordination with Israel, sent
more military forces to Sinai in Operation Eagle I to expel the militant
groups out of North Sinai’s cities.291  While the operation was success-
ful in pushing militant groups back into the mountains and other iso-
lated areas in the peninsula, it did little to resolve the underlying
grievances that fed the groups’ recruits or tacit support among the lo-
cal population.292
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In contrast to his predecessor, Morsi did not limit his response to
violence in Sinai through military operations.  After decades of hyper-
securitization under the Mubarak regime, Morsi attempted a different
strategy: to engage and negotiate with Sinai residents.293  As a former
political prisoner himself, he may have understood that state violence
would only aggravate the underlying political grievances.294  Thus,
Morsi’s administration set out to engage with tribal leaders to hear
their grievances and look for solutions moving forward.295  He invited
tribal chiefs from North Sinai to meet him and the North Sinai Gover-
nor in the presidential palace in Cairo.296  The participants discussed
a potential pardon of certain tribal detainees, developing a telecom-
munications network in Sinai, and increasing the budget for develop-
ment plans in Sinai from 50 million Egyptian pounds to 100 Egyptian
pounds.297
Morsi also promised to allow for Sinai residents to own and use
land in the planned development projects, which would require revers-
ing a 2012 resolution that banned their land ownership in the eastern
border of Sinai.298  Denial of land ownership, and by extension barring
inheritance of property, has been a long time grievance of the Bedouin
of Sinai.299  The immediate outcome was the secession of the military
campaign and a ceasefire with militants.300  The longer term outcome
was the creation of a committee of tribal chiefs and other representa-
tives to follow up with the Morsi administration.301  Whether this
committee was in fact empowered to effectuate changes in government
policy is unlikely given the military and security forces’ distrust of the
local population.
293. SABRY, supra note 32, at xxii; Mair, supra note 1, at 55 (noting that co-opting the
violent groups may be the only option for sustainable rebuilding starting at the
bottom).
294. See Breen, supra note 34, at 28.
295. Id. at 62–63.




298. Id.; Nouran El-Behairy, Sinai Bedouins Allowed to Own Land, DAILY NEWS
EGYPT (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/10/30/sinai-bedou
ins-allowed-to-own-land/ [https://perma.unl.edu/8UV6-XAWD]; see Gilad Wenig,
Opinion, Egypt Must Gamble in the Sinai, NAT’L INT. (Aug. 14, 2013), http://na
tionalinterest.org/commentary/egypt-must-gamble-the-sinai-8888 [https://perma
.unl.edu/VUQ8-8FDK] (“Amending or replacing the controversial Sinai land own-
ership law, which was passed by Morsi’s government in late 2012, would also be
constructive.  Although the law reversed official policy by allowing Sinai re-
sidents to own land, it effectively discriminates against Bedouin by requiring
them to prove their and their parents’ citizenship.”).
299. Breen, supra note 34, at 54.
300. SABRY, supra note 32, at xxii.
301. Morsy Meets Sinai Tribal Chiefs, supra note 296.
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Morsi’s administration also took the unprecedented step of engag-
ing nonviolent extremist Salafi groups who opposed the government
but were not taking responsibility for terrorist attacks.  Morsi lever-
aged his regime’s Salafi allies to mediate with militant groups to per-
suade them to stop the violence.  Under state auspices, Al Azhar
University, the global bastion of Sunni Islamic thought, conducted re-
ligious lessons to counter radicalization in Sinai.302  Muslim Brother-
hood leaders met with tribal elders in Sinai to debunk the
jurisprudence of the jihadist and takfir movements.303  As political Is-
lamists who worked through the political system to oppose govern-
ment policies, the Muslim Brotherhood representatives hoped to
persuade the Salafi militants to reject fatwas that call for killing inno-
cent people, attacking gas pipelines, or committing other offenses
against the state.304
Morsi’s regime went as far as proposing that leaders of the largest
Bedouin tribes be trained and employed to operate checkpoints
against militant attacks.305  The reasoning was that the Bedouin
would be vested in securing the Sinai against militant insurgents.
Meanwhile, the insurgents would fear attacking the Bedouin because
informal tribal law would require revenge on the group.306
To be sure, Morsi’s strategy was highly suspect in Egyptian and
Israeli security circles that deemed engaging with insurgent groups
anathema to national security.  That Morsi was a political Islamist
made the military all the more wary of his intentions and alle-
giances.307  Opponents viewed Morsi’s approach as placation at best
or tacit support at worst.308  Instead, the Egyptian military wanted to
pursue an aggressive military offensive in Sinai.  In November of
2012, Morsi reportedly ordered Field Marshall El-Sisi (who was to be-
come Egypt’s president in 2014 following a military coup and purport-
302. Gold, supra note 11, at 13.
303. Richard Barrett, Legitimacy, Credibility and Relevance: The Tools of Terrorists
and ‘Counter-Terrorists’, in AFTER THE WAR ON TERROR: REGIONAL AND MULTILAT-
ERAL PERSPECTIVES ON COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY, 26–27 (Alex P. Schmid &
Gary F. Hindle eds., 2009) (“In Islam, only a properly qualified judge can declare
someone an unbeliever (kufr), and then only in very specific circumstances.
Takfirism, as the Al-Qa’ida practice has come to be known, is further condemned
in the Islamic world as likely to lead to another very serious offence, which is to
cause fitna, or splits in the Muslim community.”).
304. Mahmoud Chaaban Bayoumi, Egypt’s Muslim Brothers Preach Nonviolence to Si-
nai Jihadis, AL-MONITOR (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/se-
curity/01/08/brotherhood-hold-juristic-revisions-to-takfir-groups-in-the-sina.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/8DE7-MS2E].
305. Aya Batrawy, Egypt Mulls Arming Sinai Bedouin Security Forces, YAHOO! NEWS
(Oct. 8, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/egypt-mulls-arming-sinai-bedouin-security-
force-180514131.html [https://perma.unl.edu/RR7X-TVFN].
306. Gilbert, Nature = Life, supra note 24, at 44.
307. SABRY, supra note 32, at 166.
308. Gold, supra note 11, at 13.
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edly free elections)309 to hold off planned raids and offenses.310  As
part of a broader strategy to improve relations with Hamas, Morsi also
reportedly asked intelligence officers to meet with Hamas leader
Khaled Meshaal to address the killings of the soldiers and prevent
further attacks.  The security elite refused to work with a group they
deemed terrorist.311  And the military leadership was increasingly
suspicious of Morsi’s soft tactics they deemed did not properly avenge
the deaths of Egyptian soldiers.312
Morsi’s strategy ultimately failed.  Not only was he unable to at-
tain buy-in from the military on a non-militarized solution to Sinai’s
problems, but militant groups continued their attacks with Sinai re-
sidents held hostage in between.313  Violent extremist Salafi groups
condemned the Muslim Brotherhood as tyrants who failed to rule ac-
cording to strict interpretations of Shari’a.314  Sinai tribal leaders crit-
icized Morsi’s regime to be no different than Mubarak as they
experienced the same neglect and economic deprivation.315  However,
some Bedouin noted the decrease in mistreatment and arbitrary ar-
rests during Morsi’s year in power.316
As Morsi became weaker in the final months of his presidency,
militants brazenly kidnapped seven Egyptian soldiers in May 2013.317
While the military and Morsi administration were able to negotiate
the soldiers’ release in exchange for releasing Islamist prisoners, the
aggressive clampdown on Sinai continued.318  In the end, Morsi’s brief
one-year presidency and incomplete development strategy produced
little change in Sinai’s economic and political situation.319  What came
next pushed Sinai closer to the brink of a failed sub-state.
309. Sahar F. Aziz, Bringing Down an Uprising: Egypt’s Stillborn Revolution, 30
CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2014).
310. The Root of Egypt’s Coup, supra note 289.
311. Id.; Breen, supra note 34, at 69–70.
312. Tuitel, supra note 256, at 84–85.
313. Egyptian Troops in Sinai Mistakenly Fire on Bedouin Funeral: AP, AHRAM ON-
LINE (May 21, 2013), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentPrint/1/0/72026/
Egypt/0/Egyptian-troops-in-Sinai-mistakenly-fire-on-Bedoui.aspx [https://perma
.unl.edu/F93R-66VQ]; Graham-Harrison, supra note 56; Ezzat, supra note 24.
314. Alexandrani, supra note 59, at 17; Al-Arian, supra note 253.
315. Sabry, supra note 179.




317. SABRY, supra note 32, at xxiii.
318. Id.; Khalil, supra note 101; Gold, supra note 11, at 13; Breen, supra note 34, at 53
(noting the abduction of tourists or government officials has been used by the
Bedouin as a way of negotiating for the release of their members because it is the
only tactic the government is responsive to).
319. Breen, supra note 34, at 77–79.
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The combination of a disgruntled population, geographic and cul-
tural isolation, poverty, a security vacuum, arms smuggling and mili-
tant groups with pre-existing political agendas to control the Sinai
proved toxic.320  The Sinai soon became a launching pad for attacks
against Israel and the Egyptian government.  As attacks in Sinai and
the mainland increased, the same group claimed responsibility—An-
sar Beit Al Maqdis (ABM).  A Sinai-based group founded by Egyptians
trained in Afghanistan and Syria, ABM claimed credit for bombings in
North and South Sinai, an assassination attempt on the Egyptian in-
terior minister in 2013, and attacks on security buildings in the Cairo,
Dakahliya, Ismailiya, and Sharqiya governorates.321  ABM also
targeted the natural gas pipeline that crosses the Sinai Peninsula to
provide gas to Egypt’s industrial zones, Jordan, and Israel.322  In the
eighteen months following the 2011 uprising, the pipeline was at-
tacked at least fifteen times.323  The attacks were both symbolic and
pragmatic.  For some Bedouin, the gas was a stolen resource by the
Egyptian state and for the militant groups it was considered a Muslim
resource sold to the “Zionist occupier.”324
What started out as a small urban terrorist group, the ABM
morphed into a formidable insurgency with a couple of thousand
Egyptian fighters.325  The ABM appealed to disenfranchised youth
from North Sinai to join it in the fight against tyranny.326  Bedouin
and Palestinian grievances soon morphed into a more ambitious
agenda to create a province of ISIS in Sinai.327  After the military-led
deposal of Morsi in July 2013, ABM shifted its focus from attacks on
the Egypt–Israeli gas pipeline and cross border attacks to an exclusive
focus on fighting the Egyptian army.328  Suicide bombings at army
320. Ronen, supra note 64, at 307; SABRY, supra note 32, at 16; Khalil, supra note 101.
(noting one checkpoint near the Gaza border was attacked 39 times in the first
six months of 2013).
321. Gold, supra note 11, at 8; Al-Qaeda’s Expansion in Egypt, supra note 233, at 9–21
(Statement of Thomas Joscelyn, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democ-
racies); SMITH, supra note 2, at 78 (discussing how the “Afghan alumni” returned
to their home countries to join militant Islamist groups); YOSSEF & CERAMI, supra
note 34, at 51.
322. Breen, supra note 34, at 26.
323. Gold, supra note 11, at 3–4; Laub, supra note 91.
324. Gold, supra note 11, at 3–4; After Joining IS, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis Expands into
Egypt, AL-MONITOR (Dec 1, 2014), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/
2014/12/egypt-ansar-maqdis-sinai-spread.html; SABRY, supra note 32, at 36–37
[https://perma.unl.edu/W32B-9RSW].
325. Natasha Ezrow, How Islamic State Is Moving Its Egyptian Battle from Sinai to
Cairo, CONVERSATION (August 21, 2015, 1:34 AM), http://theconversation.com/
how-islamic-state-is-moving-its-egyptian-battle-from-sinai-to-cairo-46439 [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/HY7G-8RFD].
326. Ronen, supra note 64, at 303; Awad & Hashem, supra note 241.
327. SABRY, supra note 32, at 145; al-Anani, supra note 227.
328. Gold, supra note 11, at 8.
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checkpoints starting in 2014 until the present have killed dozens of
soldiers.329
After a year of protracted violence after Morsi’s ouster, ABM
pledged its allegiance to ISIS in November 2014 and formally changed
its name to Wilayat Sinai (the Sinai Province of ISIS).330  In addition
to targeting the state’s security apparatus, Wilayat Sinai increasingly
targeted civilians accused of collaborating with Israeli or Egyptian in-
telligence.331  It also escalated its attacks to densely populated areas
in the Nile Delta and Cairo, including the Mansoura Security Head-
quarters in December 2013.332  Their attacks became more sophisti-
cated as shoulder-fired missiles that require training were used to
down a military helicopter in Sinai in January 2014.333  As it grew in
strength and sophistication, Wilayat Sinai became the umbrella group
that connected militant jihadist groups in Sinai and from across
Egypt.  Although the militant group does not control significant areas
of land, Wilayat Sinai is the second strongest branch of ISIS outside of
Syria and Iraq after ISIS in Libya.334
329. Graham-Harrison, supra note 56; Hassan & Bayoumy, supra note 104; Yusri
Mohamed & Ahmed Hassan, More than 100 Dead as Militants, Egyptian Army
Clash in North Sinai, REUTERS (July 1, 2015, 6:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
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in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, AL ARABIYA ENGLISH (May 31, 2016), http://english.al
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330. Menna Zaki, Amira El-Fekki & Mahmoud Mostafa, ‘State of Sinai’ Claim Hun-
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.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/01/31/state-sinai-claim-hundreds-killings-sinai-at-
tacks/ [https://perma.unl.edu/746D-TFE7]; David D. Kirkpatrick, Militant Group
in Egypt Vows Loyalty to ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes
.com/2014/11/11/world/middleeast/egyptian-militant-group-pledges-loyalty-to-isis
.html?_r=0; JESSICA STERN & J. M. BERGER, ISIS: THE STATE OF TERROR 184–85
(2015).
331. Zack Gold, North Sinai Population Continues to Sacrifice for Egypt, TAHRIR INST.
FOR MIDDLE E. POL’Y (May 18, 2015), http://timep.org/commentary/north-sinai-
population-continues-to-sacrifice-for-egypt/ [https://perma.unl.edu/6S4N-
DLMM].
332. Al-Qaeda’s Expansion in Egypt, supra note 233, at 25 (Statement of Mohamed
Elmenshawy, Resident Scholar at the Middle Eastern Institute).
333. Id.
334. Graham-Harrison, supra note 56; Betsy Hiel, Egypt Open to Jihadist Violence,
Experts Warn, TRIB LIVE (Jan. 30, 2016, 10:40 PM), http://triblive.com/usworld/
middleeast/9890114-74/egypt-isis-sinai [https://perma.unl.edu/CTJ4-73WD]
(“The expanding control of an ISIS affiliate in Libya has grown so worrisome that
the United States is considering ‘military options’ there, a Pentagon spokesman
said last week.”); Jim Sciutto, Barbara Starr & Kevin Liptak, ISIS Fighters in
Libya Surge as Group Suffers Setbacks in Syria, Iraq, CNN (Feb. 4, 2016, 4:39
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C. Violence in Sinai Reaches New Heights after Morsi is
Deposed
The military coup that removed President Mohamed Morsi on July
3, 2013, was a major setback for democracy in Egypt.  That Morsi was
democratically elected and a member of an Islamist political party
strengthened the violent Salafi militant groups’ strategic ideological
claim: only through violence could the abusive security apparatus be
stopped.335  Morsi’s ouster also united the disparate militant groups
under Ansar Beit Al Maqdis, which soon thereafter created an Egyp-
tian franchise of ISIS.336  Militant groups used Morsi’s ouster as justi-
fication for hundreds of violent attacks across Egypt, thereby creating
a serious security crisis in mainland Egypt.  They targeted disaffected
Muslim Brotherhood members and Bedouin for recruitment.  The
sharp rise in violence transitioned Sinai from a dangerous haven for
terrorism to a conflict zone.337
When thousands of Muslim Brotherhood leaders and members
were arrested as their assets were frozen, businesses closed, and so-
cial services shut down, terrorist attacks in mainland Egypt in-
creased.338  Militant groups attacked churches, police stations, police
checkpoints, and other state targets.339  In July 2013, Sinai-based
militants bombed the Mansoura police station, killing fifteen police-
men and injuring over 130 people.340  Militants paraded gruesome
images of the hundreds of Egyptians killed by Egyptian security forces
in Cairo’s Raba’a and Nahda Squares in August 2013 to portray the
attacks as self-defense against a tyrannical state.341  In December
2013, Ansar Beit Al Maqdis conducted a suicide bomb of the Daqah-
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/04/politics/isis-fighters-libya-syria-iraq/
[https://perma.unl.edu/P2XG-56NC]; Malsin, supra note 113.
335. Revkin, supra note 26; see also Daniel Byman, Fighting Terrorism with Democ-
racy?, in RADICAL ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: CHALLENGES AND RE-
SPONSES 188, 201 (Hillel Frisch & Efraim Inbar eds., 2008) (cautioning against
the perils of Western support of military coups after Islamists win elections, as
was the case in Algeria in 1991 and 1992, resulting in extremist Islamist groups
recruiting tens of thousands of people).
336. Graham-Harrison, supra note 56; SABRY, supra note 32, at 159.
337. Graham-Harrison, supra note 56; Awad & Hashem, supra note 241.
338. Gold, supra note 11, at 19; Maria Gloria Polimeno, Chief Prosecutor Killed by Car
Bomb as Egypt Marks Two Years of al-Sisi, CONVERSATION (June 30, 2015, 8:38
AM), http://theconversation.com/chief-prosecutor-killed-by-car-bomb-as-egypt-
marks-two-years-of-al-sisi-43570 [https://perma.unl.edu/99AL-6RN5].
339. Gold, supra note 11, at 19; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2014 157–223 (June 2015), http://www.state
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340. Gold, supra note 11, at 5; 15 Dead, 134 Injured in Egypt’s Mansoura Explosion,
AHRAM ONLINE (Dec. 24, 2013), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsPrint/89902
.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/BC3H-AV7W].
341. SABRY, supra note 32, at xxiii, 211.
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liya Security Directorate in the Nile Delta.342  The violence continued
throughout 2014 and 2015, as multiple security targets were bombed
in Cairo, Damietta, and other cities in the mainland.343
Bombings in Sinai also became more frequent and more lethal.344
Prior to Morsi’s removal, ABM focused its attacks on Israel in collabo-
ration with Gaza based militant groups.  After July 2013, however,
ABM shifted its focus to Egypt’s security services and military.345  In
July and August 2013, security personnel were under attack on a near
daily basis.346  As a result, in the last half of 2013, approximately 200
soldiers and over 70 security personnel were killed in Sinai.347  The
attacks became more sophisticated, as evinced by the downing of an
Egyptian helicopter in January 2014.348  After thirty-one soldiers
were killed in a suicide bombing in October 2014, Sisi declared a state
of emergency in Northeast Sinai that encompassed Rafah, Sheikh
Zuwayd, Al-Arish, and dozens of other villages.349  As of the writing of
this Article, emergency law is still in effect.350
As terrorists killed more soldiers—interpreted by some Egyptians
as an indicia of military ineptness—the Egyptian military imposed a
media blackout.351  Designating North Sinai as a military zone, the
military prohibited journalists from entering.352  Western journalists
342. Ronen, supra note 64, at 302.
343. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 339; Egypt: Ten
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346. Gold, supra note 11, at 3.
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2014, 12:13 PM), http://www.timesofisrael.com/militants-claim-downing-of-egyp-
tian-helicopter/ [https://perma.unl.edu/RRS8-AYP5].
349. Ismail Alexandrani, The Politics of the Egypt-Gaza Buffer Zone, CARNEGIE EN-
DOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Nov. 25, 2014), http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/
?fa=57316.  As of the writing of this article, that state of emergency is still in
effect.  Mostafa Hashen & Eric Knecht, Egypt Extends State of Emergency in
North Sinai by Three Months, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2015, 6:10 AM), http://www
.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-sinai-idUSKCN0SM12T20151028 [https://perma
.unl.edu/7PN3-NPNB]; Mohamed Hassan Shaban, Egypt Declares “New” State of
Emergency in North Sinai, ASHARQ AL-AWSAT (April 26, 2015, 4:47 PM), http://
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were not permitted to pass military checkpoints on the road to Al Ar-
ish.353  Journalists able to reach Sinai or living in Sinai were
harassed, intimidated, and had their equipment smashed.354  The less
fortunate Egyptian reporters have been subjected to military trials for
allegedly spreading false information and threatening national secur-
ity—with the most recent case being Ismail Alexandrani in November
2015.355
Since October 2013, communication networks, mobile and land
telephone lines, and the internet have been cut off six to twelve hours
per day.356  In August 2015, the military’s clamp down extended to a
new counterterrorism law that imposed fines of 200,000 to 500,000
Egyptian pounds on anyone who published information on militant at-
tacks or military operations that the military deemed false.357  Jour-
nalists could have their license stripped for up to one year.358  As a
result, events in Sinai go unreported or are limited to government
propaganda that omits material information that would disclose the
military’s struggle to retain control, including casualty rates of
soldiers.359  For example, the military reported in July 2015 that more
than 240 militants were killed, four wanted terrorists were arrested,
and twenty-nine terrorist suspects were arrested after simultaneous
attacks on military checkpoints.360  Two months later in September
2015, the military reported killing 415 militants and arresting 320
people.361  Meanwhile, Wilayat Sinai claimed responsibility for at-
.com/world/2015/aug/17/egyptian-president-ratifies-law-to-punish-false-report-
ing-of-terror-attacks [https://perma.unl.edu/HPZ6-PSPE].
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Remain Poor: Residents, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (July 21, 2015), http://www.daily
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tacking fifteen security sites and carrying out three suicide bombings
that killed more than twenty-one soldiers.362  Without independent
journalists, it is difficult to know whether the military’s reports are
accurate and to what extent innocent civilians are being rounded up in
the security sweep, similar to what occurred in 2004 to 2006.
What has unfolded in Sinai over the past five years is a return to
the cycle of state and nonstate violence that adds fresh wounds to the
local populations’ longstanding grievances, making stability more elu-
sive.363  The military has taken the place of the loathed Ministry of
Interior’s security services in collectively punishing residents.  Intense
and sustained military operations have killed hundreds of militants,
but they have also led to human rights violations.  Main roads are
closed and checkpoints litter the road between Al Arish and Rafah,
making the thirty-five minute ride a three to four hour trek of humili-
ation at the hands of state security.364  The military clampdown has
also created a shortage in drinking water, food, and skyrocketing in-
flation.365  The heavily armed militant groups brutally kill any civil-
ian they suspect of sympathizing with or assisting the military while
the military suspects those not assisting the army of being ter-
rorists.366  Residents are caught in the crossfire between the militants
and the military.367
The military’s scorched-earth strategy has destroyed hundreds of
homes and farms through raids and airstrikes.368  With no warnings
to evacuate, air bombings have killed civilians and burned homes of
impoverished Bedouin.369  The indiscriminate tactics that kill civil-
ians while militants hide in safety evince a lack of good intelligence by
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government officials.370  Sinai residents have also complained of se-
curity personnel stealing their money, jewelry, clothes, and furniture
before burning down their homes under the auspices that they belong
to terrorist suspects.371  Militant groups, in turn, leverage populist
anger to recruit Bedouin and other Sinai residents to attack the army
as self-defense and retribution for rights abuses.372  State violence
only begets more nonstate violence.
One tactic, in particular, has angered tens of thousands of Rafah
residents and effectively depopulated the city of Rafah.373  In October
2014, Sisi announced the military would create a buffer zone within
1,000 meters (originally 500 meters) of the Gaza-Rafah border.
Rather than use sophisticated tunnel detecting technology, the mili-
tary razed all homes and buildings to eliminate all smuggling tunnels
to Gaza.374  Residents— most of whom are not Bedouin—were given
only forty-eight-hours notice to pack their belongings and leave their
homes.375  Between 1,200 and 2,000 homes have been destroyed, hun-
dreds of hectares of farmland razed, and 3,200 families forcibly evicted
over the past two years.376  Residents did not receive sufficient com-
pensation for their homes and none at all for their farmland.377  Nor
did residents have any effective means to challenge their eviction,
demolition, or amount of compensation.378  Thus, the expelled re-
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tremists’ infiltration of  Egypt’s military intelligence).
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sidents have all the more reason to join their Bedouin neighbors in
decrying government abuses.379
As the military’s rhetoric focused on the weapons smuggling occur-
ring in the tunnels, they failed to discuss the economic conditions that
produced the underground tunnels in the first place.380  Few employ-
ment opportunities in Sinai coupled with Israel’s harsh restrictions on
trade to Gaza produced a lucrative black market.381  Bedouin, other
Sinai residents, and Egyptian security all benefited financially from
the tunnel smuggling.  Indeed, without Egyptian security cooperation
(for bribes) the tunnels could not have operated for so many years.382
Thus, when Sisi violently created the buffer zone, he not only made
thousands of Rafah residents homeless but he also stripped them of
their main source of income without providing alternative lawful em-
ployment.383  The Sisi regime’s tactics transformed a security problem
into a full-fledged insurgency.384
As Sinai’s residents bore the brunt of militarized governance, they
also fell victim to militant groups’ barbaric violence.385  For example,
militants killed eight Bedouin within two days in December 2013 for
allegedly collaborating with the army.386  In August 2014, ABM de-
capitated four men in North Sinai for allegedly being informants for
Israel.387  In the spring of 2015, a member of the Tarabin tribe refused
to distribute a Wilayat Sinai flyer.  That same day, the militants went
to his house and killed him.388  Other Bedouin have been targets of
violence for speaking out against the militants.389  In another case in
April 2015, Wilayat Sinai kidnapped, raped, and beheaded a Bedouin
woman for allegedly collaborating with the army.390  Targeting wo-
men, a serious offense under Bedouin traditions, triggered a conflict
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between the militants and some tribes.391  The Egyptian media re-
ported that more than a dozen tribes issued a joint statement con-
demning the militants and allying themselves with the government to
fight against terrorism.392  The tribes reportedly went so far as put-
ting a $130,000 bounty on a militant leader.393  Although some ana-
lysts question the veracity of the statement, that the Bedouin were
willing to put aside the decades of state neglect and violence to ally
with the state speaks volumes about the level of violence employed by
the militants.394  Moreover, the militants’ activities are threatening
the tribes’ business interests and encroaching on their land.395
V. CONCLUSION
This Article looks to the Sinai as a case study to demonstrate that
authoritarian state violence is a counterproductive response to terror-
ism.  Securitized counterterrorism policies escalate the violence, in-
crease the civilian death toll and legitimize the terrorists groups’
narratives as the peoples’ defenders against state injustice.  Thus,
human development should replace the predominant “security first”
approaches in developing long term, sustainable policies for decreas-
ing politically motivated, nonstate violence.  In doing so, international
organizations must candidly address the role of authoritarianism and
its externalities in producing nonstate violence in the form of terror-
ism.  That is, state violence perpetrated by dictatorships creates a cul-
ture of fear and violence where the only means of resisting oppression
is through more violence.396  Terrorist groups leverage the anger of
local residents collectively punished for acts of resistance to recruit,397
causing the cycle of deprivation and instability to continue unabated.
Meanwhile, nonviolent opponents to political repression are marginal-
ized as naı¨ve and ineffective.  In the end, the militarized approach to
governance pushes failing states further on the path toward becoming
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a conflict zone.398  As a result, scholars have found that terrorism is
correlated with political repression, and aggravated when coupled
with poverty.399
As this Article’s in-depth examination of the underlying causes of
insurgency and terrorism in Sinai demonstrates, counterterrorism
policies are deficient for at least three reasons.  First, Western
counterterrorism agendas that focus on short term prevention of vio-
lent extremism without meaningfully addressing the underlying polit-
ical, social, and economic conditions contribute to the rise of violent
extremism over the long run.400  Second, securitization of human de-
velopment results in over-allocating resources to military and security
personnel while neglecting the development needs of the local popula-
tion who are the first targets of recruitment by militant groups.401
Although nations pay lip service to development as integral to stabil-
ity,402 development remains an afterthought to national security.  So
long as the ongoing development projects do not address the social,
political, and economic problems head on, efforts spent on develop-
ment will merely exacerbate Sinai’s downward spiral into a failing
sub-state.  Finally, the failure to localize and contextualize the causes
of violent extremism that arise from underdevelopment lends itself to
one-size-fits-all counterterrorism strategies that aggravate rather
than reduce violence.403  And when development is undertaken, it
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often suffers from the domestic and foreign governments’ failure to in-
clude local Bedouin and other Sinai leaders in the planning and imple-
mentation.404  Thus, international responses should be grounded in
localized political, social, and economic needs—not merely interna-
tional security or Western interests.405
To be sure, the development and security challenges in Sinai are
grave.  No easy solutions exist to the complex, localized causes of in-
stability, political repression, and poverty.  As witnessed in Iraq and
Syria, Wilayat Sinai’s local insurgency may spread beyond its borders
and merge with other burgeoning ISIS branches in Tunisia, Libya,
and other North African nations.  Sinai offers the international com-
munity an opportunity to be an exemplar in creating a more effective
and sustainable model to prevent terrorism.
Most notably, Sinai teaches that nonstate violence arises from local
social, political, and economic grievances associated with state vio-
lence—not religious ideology.  The latter is a second order problem
consequent to the first order economic, social, and political problems.
Policy responses, therefore, must be contextualized within the local
environment where violence is occurring—whether it is Sinai, Iraq,
Syria, Yemen, Libya, or other conflict zones in the Middle East.  In
contrast, a homogenous regional approach is sure to fail due to the
vast differences in demographics, history and context across the re-
gion.  Local residents are entitled to plan and lead development efforts
with assistance from their government and the international commu-
nity, rather than the other way around.
What happens in Sinai can offer valuable insights for policy mak-
ers and international organizations engaged in development and
counterterrorism in failing states.  The lessons learned from the Sinai
can be applied to other contexts where nonstate violence is high to
develop effective counterterrorism strategies that address the under-
lying causes rather than the symptoms of terrorism.  With the de-
creasing relevance of borders, fluidity of migration, and ubiquity of
technology, the nature of conflict has fundamentally changed over the
past century.  Nonstate actors have grown both in number and
strength as they challenge nation states’ monopoly over the use of
force and make nation-state borders all the less relevant.
It is long overdue to revisit how the international community seeks
to reduce violence both in strong and fragile states, and ultimately
minimize the threat of terrorism.  Shifting our paradigm to recognize
that nonstate action is an offspring of state violence, particularly in
authoritarian states, is an important step toward that end.
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